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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 1982, Florida voters adopted an amendment to
the Florida Constitution meant to have a profound impact on the
ability of Florida courts to develop their own approach to search and
seizure law. Before the effective date of the amendment, article I,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution read:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, sup-
ported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places
to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be
seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature
of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained
in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence. I
As amended, effective January 4, 1983, the provision requires that
the "right . . . to be secure" described in this language "be construed
in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."'2 The amend-
ment also added the following clause to the last sentence of the pro-
vision: "if such articles or information would be inadmissible under
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution. '" 3 As a result of these
changes, Florida courts must abide by fourth amendment decisions of
the United States Supreme Court when interpreting article I, section
12.
This article examines the "forced linkage" between state and federal
provisions that the 1983 amendment establishes in Florida. It concludes
that forced linkage is ill-conceived, because it is inimical to state court
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968).
2. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 12 (1983).
3. Id.
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independence. Accordingly, this article argues, the 1983 amendment
to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution should be repealed.
If not repealed, it should be interpreted to permit Florida courts broad
discretion in developing their own stance on search and seizure law.
So construed, the amendment would only require Florida courts to
abide by those United States Supreme Court opinions that provide
(1) an authoritative holding that is (2) based solely on the fourth amend-
ment to the federal Constitution, (3) consistent with rights available
to Florida citizens through other sources of law, and that (4) preceded
the vote on the amendment. Furthermore, even when a Supreme
Court ruling meets these four requirements, Florida courts would be
entitled to conform their opinions to the ruling in the manner least
repugnant to the notion of state court independence.
Parts II and III of this article analyze the jurisprudence of state
court reliance on state law as a means of providing greater protection
of lights than that afforded under the federal constitution. This juris-
prudence provides the theoretical justification for repealing the 1983
amendment or, alternatively, construing it as narrowly as possible.
Assuming the 1983 amendment will not be repealed, part IV of this
article explores how Florida courts can develop their own approach
to search and seizure law despite the amendment.
H. STATE COURT RELIANCE ON STATE LAW
Virtually no one contests the notion that, absent state constitutional
language to the contrary, state courts can ignore the federal judiciary's
stance on subjects over which there is concurrent jurisdiction, 4 if their
approach meets the federal "minimum." 5 Although not yet fully
4. In the constitutional criminal procedure areas at issue in this article, state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In some areas, e.g., patent law, the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). In other areas, e.g., some aspects of labor law,
federal law preempts state law and state courts hearing such cases must apply federal law. See
gene/rally Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 635 (1983) (analyzing the current tests of preemption under federal law and their relationship
to the collective bargaining system).
5. Even those who generally disfavor interpretations of state law that are more protective
than federal law concede this point. See, e.g., Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitu-
tions: The Eiergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1141-43 (1985)
(Justices of United States Supreme Court vary in their enthusiasm toward state court experimen-
tation, but all accept state authority to do so); Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism,
63 TEX. L. REv. 995 (1985) (although state court activism should be curtailed, "generally
accepted legal conventions clearly establish the independence of state court judges on issues of
state law."). Note that it is theoretically possible for a state court to interpret the state constitu-
tion to provide less protection than the federal minimum, although "having once denied a claim
based on state law, state judges must accord to a rights claimant any or all rights guaranteed
655
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explored, the basis of this authority is inherent in the language of the
tenth amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."6 On
several occasions the Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the idea
that state law restrictions on state action may exceed those under
federal law. For instance, in Cooper v. California,7 the Court re-
minded: "Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to
impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by
the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so."8
An interesting development in federal-state relations during the
last fifteen years has been the eagerness of state courts to embrace
this principle. State courts have increasingly relied on their own con-
stitutions as a basis for rejecting Supreme Court pronouncements and
announcing standards more solicitous of individual rights.9 The ques-
tion remains whether the development of independent constitutional
doctrine at the state level is desirable. This part lays the groundwork
for answering this question by describing the history of state constitu-
tional interpretation nationwide and in Florida. The next part assesses
the lessons to be learned from this history.
A. The Four Phases of State-Federal Judicial Interplay
State court views on the relative importance of state and federal
law can be divided into four historical phases, the last three of which
under federal law." Collins & Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Surz'ey
of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 327 (1986).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
7. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
8. Id. at 62; see also City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)
("[a] state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this
Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in
favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee."); PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("Our reasoning ... does not ex proprio vigore limit
the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitu-
tion."); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("Of course, the states are free, pursuant
to their own law, to adopt a higher standard [than the Court's requirement that the prosecution
show the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence].").
9. See generally Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random Thoughts, 54
Miss. L.J. 371, 372-74 (1984) (since 1970, more than 250 state court opinions hold that constitu-
tional minima under the federal Constitution are insufficient under state law); Collins & Galie,
The Methodology, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-8 (collecting over 300 such cases decided since
1970).
[Vol. 39
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overlap considerably. 10 The first phase, from the founding of the repub-
lic until approximately the middle of this century, has been called the
"dual federalism" period, since the Bill of Rights had no binding effect
on state courts.,, The second phase, which peaked during the early
1970s, might be called the "co-option" period, because the advent of
the incorporation doctrine,12 combined with the activism of the United
States Supreme Court, created the impression that federal law stated
the exclusive standard on constitutional issues. 13 The third phase, from
the early 1970s to the present, has been called the "New Federalism"
period because state courts have been much more willing to diverge
from the federal standard, although recognizing that they must main-
tain it as the minimum.14 The final phase, still nascent, could be called
the "forced-linkage" era. This term is meant to describe the impact
of electoral decisions, such as the ratification of the 1983 amendment
to article I, section 12, requiring state courts to equate state constitu-
tional law with federal constitutional law. These four phases describe
the dominant trends in state court-federal court interaction on all
topics of constitutional importance. The discussion below will focus on
constitutional rights associated with the criminal process, particularly
search and seizure.
10. The first three phases described below duplicate phases described both by Collins,
supra note 9, at 378-79, and Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1144-54.
11. The term "dual federalism" comes from Walker, who notes that few state powers were
circumscribed by the federal government until the 1930s. Walker, American Federalism -
Then a'nd Now, in 24 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 23, 23 (1982). In the criminal procedure area,
this hands-off attitude persisted for another thirty years. See infra text accompanying notes
15-33.
12. See bifra note 19.
13. Walker uses the term "cooptive federalism" to describe the period between 1960 and
1980 when the federal government actively sought to regulate several aspects of government
affairs that had traditionally been entrusted to local authorities. Walker, supra note 11, at 24-25;
see also Collins, supra note 9, at 379.
14. Several commentators have used this term to designate the state court activism de-
scribed in the text. See, e.g., Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska Supreme
Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalism 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 221,
221 (1982-83); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the
Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 166 (B. McGraw ed. 1985);
Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29
STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977). The term has also been used to describe the United States
Supreme Court's attempts to limit state criminal defendant access to federal courts. See C.
WHITEHEAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CON-
CEPTS 7 (1986). In each context, the goal is to recognize a more significant role for state
government, approaching that of dual federalism days; thus the term "new federalism."
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1. Dual Federalism
During the first 150 years under the federal Constitution, the crim-
inal process guarantees found in the fourth,,' fifth,'6 sixth,'7 and
eighthis amendments applied only to federal cases. Since its ratification
in 1868, the fourteenth amendment has provided a vehicle for guaran-
teeing these rights to state criminal defendants through the "incorpo-
ration" principle.1 9 But it was not until well into the twentieth century
that the Supreme Court indicated any willingness to find the various
criminal process rights so fundamental that the states could not abridge
them.20 Only after the Warren Court 2' reinvigorated the incorporation
idea, beginning with Mapp v. Ohio"2 in 1961, could the state criminal
15. The fourth amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and re-
quires that warrants be issued upon probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. The fifth amendment provides four protections relevant to criminal cases. The amend-
ment requires a grand jury indictment for capital "or otherwise infamous crimes," and prohibits
subjecting any person to double jeopardy for the same offense, compelling one to be a witness
against oneself, and depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. The sixth amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," and guarantees the accused the
rights to notice, to confront prosecution witnesses, to compulsory process, and to assistance of
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
19. The fourteenth amendment states in part that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. ."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Prior to the adoption of this language in 1868, the Supreme
Court held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were not directly binding upon the state
governments. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Once the fourteenth
amendment was ratified, however, the Court was able to hold that the states may not violate
those Bill of Rights guarantees that are necessary to due process. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), for instance, the Court stated that if a Bill of Rights guarantee is "of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," id. at 325, and is one of the "fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions," id. at 328
(quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)), then the right is incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment and applies to the states. Id. at 324-25.
20. The first Supreme Court case that relied on the federal Constitution to overturn a state
criminal conviction was Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). There the Court held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that counsel be provided to criminal
defendants charged with capital crimes. Powell was strictly limited to capital cases, however.
Id. at 71. Most of the Court's decisions federalizing constitutional criminal procedure did not
come until the 1960s. See infra notes 23-27.
21. This term is used to designate the Court from 1953 to 1969, the years Earl Warren
served as Chief Justice.
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 39
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defendant depend upon fourth amendment protections,2 the privilege
against self-incrimination,- the double jeopardy clause,2 sixth amend-
ment trial rights, 26 and protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.
Before the 1960s, then, state courts were almost entirely free to
develop their own rules of criminal procedure, despite the fact that
state constitutional provisions were usually similar or identical to the
analogous federal provisions.2 State courts interpreted their provisions
in one of three ways. They either explicitly followed federal court
interpretations of federal provisions;2 viewed federal case law as a
helpful guidepost, but not dispositive;30 or ignored it altogether.31
23. In Mapp, id., the Court held that illegally seized evidence must be excluded from state
as well as federal criminal trials. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), a pre-Warren Court
decision, had held the fourth amendment applicable to the states. But this holding was essentially
meaningless until Mapp provided the exclusionary sanction. See 367 U.S. at 652 ("other remedies
have been worthless and futile").
24. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment applied to states through
fourteenth amendment).
25. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy applies to states, over-
ruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
26. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial applies to states);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial right); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confron-
tation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
27. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual clause applies to
states).
28. See, e.g. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1204
(1971) (table listing state antecedents to clauses in Bill of Rights showing similarity between
state constitutional provisions and Bill of Rights). For modern examples of the same tendency,
compare FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 9, 12, 17 with U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, IV, VIII,
respectively; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7, 12 with U.S. CONST. amends. VII, V, IV, respectively;
ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 9, 14 with U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, IV, respectively.
29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Hanson, 86 Kan. 632, 634, 121 P. 1094, 1095 (1912) ("Due course
of law under the state constitution and due process of law under the federal constitution mean
the same thing . . ").
30. See, e.g., State v. Miles, 29 Wash. 2d 921, 926-27, 190 P.2d 740, 745-46 (1948) (relying
in part on United States v. Die Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 209-10,
47 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1943) (relying in part on Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir.
1920)); Houck v. State, 106 Ohio 195, 199, 140 N.E. 112, 114 (1922) (relying in part on Lambert
v. United States, 282 F. 413 (9th Cir. 1922)). All of these cases pointed to the similarity hetveen
the state and federal search and seizure provisions.
31. See Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1144-46 (during nineteenth century, "state courts
routinely resolved constitutional issues without reference to the federal constitution").
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Often, the latter two approaches resulted in state standards that were
more prosecution-oriented than those applied at the federal levelY2
But occasionally state courts were more energetic than the federal
courts in protecting the rights of criminal defendants.s In any event,
during this phase, the independence of state and federal law was an
accepted fact.
2. Co-option
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court's activism significantly altered
the pattern of state constitutional interpretation. The Warren Court
not only applied most federal criminal rights guarantees to the states,
but also interpreted those guarantees so as to radically restructure
the criminal process. Within a decade of its decision in Mapp requiring
the states to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment, the Court had expanded tremendously the types of
searches requiring exclusion.3 Within seven years of its finding in
Gideon v. Wainwright 1 that the sixth amendment's counsel guarantee
applied to the states, the Court extended the right beyond trial pro-
ceedings to police questioning,-6 lineups s7 preliminary hearings,8 and
sentencing29 And two years after the Court found the privilege against
32. For example, numerous state courts refused to follow Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), which required that illegally seized evidence be excluded from federal prosec-
utions. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960) (appendix listing state decisions
following and rejecting Weeks).
33. For instance, at least one state court found a right to counsel at criminal trials well
before Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) guaranteed that right at the federal level. See
Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249 (1859).
34. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (adopting armspan rule for determin-
ing scope of search incident to arrest); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (refining
definition of probable cause); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (imposing requirements
for search warrant in electronic eavesdropping context); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. :347
(1967) (broadening definition of search).
35. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (defendant entitled to counsel at
post-indictment interrogation).
37. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (defendant entitled to counsel at
post-indictment line-up).
38. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (defendant entitled to counsel at preliminary
hearing).
39. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (defendant entitled to counsel at sentencing
proceeding).
[Vol. 39
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self-incrimination to be a fundamental right,", it decided Miranda v.
Arizona," causing an upheaval in the law of confessions.42
This revolution in criminal procedure made state constitutional in-
terpretation seem irrelevant. State litigants and courts were inclined
to view the federal standards as the sole source of criminal procedure
law.* I State courts either interpreted similar federal and state stand-
ards similarly, or more commonly, simply neglected to consider the
independent significance of state constitutional law.44
3. New Federalism
Developments at the Supreme Court level also prompted the third
phase in state constitutional interpretation. The Burger Court4 and
Rehnquist Court 6 retrenchment on the Warren Court's groundbreak-
ing decisions has made it exceedingly clear that federal standards do
not necessarily represent the most "progressive" approach to criminal
procedure.47 As the Court has constricted the scope of the Bill of
40. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right against self-incrimination applied to states
through fourteenth amendment).
41. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42. See generally Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985) (describing
how Miranda marked a legal, attitudinal and practical watershed with respect to interrogations).
43. See Howard, State Courts and State Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976) (during Warren era, state courts were in a habit of looking
just to federal constitutional law); Note, Robinson At Large in the Fifty States: A Continuation
of the State Bills of Rights Debate in the Search and Seizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1974) (Warren Court activism created perception that Supreme Court standards
were governing mandates and should not be exceeded).
44. For instance, in White v. State, 521 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), rev'd
sub non?. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
a car search violated the fourth amendment, making no mention of the state constitutional
search and seizure provision. The United States Supreme Court reversed, Texas v. White, 423
U.S. 67 (1975), with Justice Marshall in dissent pointing out that the Texas court could reaffirm
its result under state law if it so chose. Id. at 72. See also Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1147-48.
45. Warren Burger retired from the position of Chief Justice in 1987.
46. William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in September, 1987.
47. The Burger Court adopted several standards that were more prosecution-oriented than
the Warren Court's standards. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing a
public safety exception to Miranda). Compare Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
(adopting two-prong test for assessing reliability of probable cause determination) with Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983) (rejecting two-prong test as "hypertechnical" and adopting "totality
of the circumstances" test); compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (adopting
"armspan" rule in search incident cases) with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (eliminat-
ing armspan rule in search incident cases involving cars). For a general discussion of the Burger
Court's retrenchment, see Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal
Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN
L.J. 471 (1985).
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Rights, state courts have disinterred state law and adopted standards
more rigorous than those announced by the Supreme Court. According
to Professors Collins and Galie, between 1970 and 1986 over 300 state
decisions went beyond Supreme Court pronouncements, and more than
half of those decisions involved criminal procedure. 4-
State court reaction against the Supreme Court has been particu-
larly energetic with respect to search and seizure, perhaps because
the post-1970 Supreme Court has been especially antagonistic to the
fourth amendment. 49 Indeed, the first Supreme Court criminal proce-
dure decision to encounter significant state court resistance involved
a search and seizure issue. In United States v. Robinson the Supreme
Court held that a full search is permissible after a lawful custodial
arrest, regardless of the crime giving rise to the arrest. Within four
years of Robinson, four states' courts had held, based on state constitu-
tional language, that the nature of the offense is relevant to whether
a full search is justified. 51 Similarly, the courts of four states have
refused to follow United States v. White 2 on state law grounds, finding
untenable the Court's opinion that monitoring a private conversation
with a body bug is not a search.s At least three states' courts,l again
The Rehnquist Court has continued this trend. Compare Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160
(1987) (exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police in objectively reasonable
reliance upon a statute that authorizes warrantless searches but is later found to violate the
fourth amendment) with Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (searches conducted under
electronic surveillance statute later found unconstitutional). Compare also Colorado v. Connelly,
107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (due process and Miranda not violated unless police "cause" confession
by mentally ill individual) with Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 (1963) (when interrogated
suspect is insane, admissions of confession violate due process regardless of whether police
purpose was improper).
48. See list of cases in Collins & Galie, supra note 9, at S-9.
49. See cases cited supra note 47; see also C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note
14, at 4-5 (concluding that recent Supreme Court decisions create a hierarchy of constitutional
criminal procedure rights, with the fourth amendment at the bottom).
50. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. See Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); People v. Briesendine, 13 Cal. 3d
528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 541 P.2d 71
(1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). The Oregon Supreme Court joined
this group in 1982. State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982).
52. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
53. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla.
1981); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975); State v. Brackman, 178 Mont.
105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
54. See State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985); Commonwealth v. Upton II,
394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
[Vol. 89
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relying on their constitutions, have declined to adopt the Supreme
Court's totality of the circumstances approach to the probable cause
inquiry established in Illinois v. Gates. 5 Other Supreme Court fourth
amendment decisions that at least one state court has found unpersua-
sive include New York v. Belton,56 allowing searches of cars and con-
tainers in them when the occupant has been lawfully arrested;57 Smith
v. Maryland,s holding that a person does not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the identity of phone numbers called;5 9 and United
States v. Leon,60 establishing that a search pursuant to an invalid
warrant is lawful if the searching officer believed in objective good
faith that the warrant was valid.6 1 These examples far from exhaust
the list of issues on which state courts have come to independent
conclusions on search and seizure issues.6
Measuring the extent of the New Federalism with a different
gauge, at least thirty-five states' courts have flexed state constitutional
muscle on at least one issue of constitutional criminal procedure.6 In
the search and seizure area alone, the courts of at least twenty-three
states have chosen to adopt one or more standards espousing greater
protection than that required under the federal Constitution." A few
55. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
56. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
57. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
58. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
59. See People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); People v.
Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
60. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
61. See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987); People v. Bigelow, 66
N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.W.S.2d 630 (1985).
62. Other Supreme Court fourth amendment decisions that have been repudiated by state
courts include Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plain view seizure permitted when officer
has probable cause to believe seized item is evidence); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982) (automobile exception justifies warrantless search of containers in vehicles); United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (automatic standing for criminal defendants abolished); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records).
See list of cases in Collins & Galie, supra note 9, at S-9, S-12.
63. In addition to the 23 state courts that have adopted different search and seizure stand-
ards, see infra note 64, the courts of the following 12 states have established new standards in
other areas of criminal procedure: Alabama, Arizona, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Collins & Galie,
supra note 9, at S-9, S-12.
64. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington.
Collins & Galie, supra note 9, at S-9, S-12.
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states' courts have been particularly active. The Washington Supreme
Court, for instance, has refused to follow six different fourth amend-
ment standards that the United States Supreme Court has an-
nounced. 65 Alaska, California, and New Jersey have also been in the
forefront of those states whose courts have supplanted fourth amend-
ment minima with their own. 66
The New Federalism phase, even when viewed purely from the
fourth amendment perspective, is neither insignificant nor isolated.
Whether it will continue is open to question. Factors that will fuel
further state constitutional developments include the Supreme Court's
likely persistence in its prosecution-oriented tendencies 67 and state
courts' unwillingness to relinquish the power they have discovered
and come to enjoy over the past fifteen years.6 A factor that could
severely curtail the New Federalism, however, is the hostile reaction
of state citizens to their courts' activism.69
4. Forced Linkage
Linkage of federal and state standards can occur in two ways.
Linkage most frequently occurs when state courts interpret their con-
stitutional provisions to conform with the federal courts' interpretation
65. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) (rejecting Illinois v. Gates);
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (rejecting Washington v. Chrisman);
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (rejecting New York v. Belton); State
v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982) (rejecting Michigan v. DeFillippo); State v.
Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (rejecting United States v. Saloucci); State v.
Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 559 P.2d 970 (1977) (rejecting United States v. Ross).
66. Alaska's Supreme Court has announced at least four search and seizure rules more
protective than the United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment standards, California's
Supreme Court at least six, and New Jersey's Supreme Court at least three. See list of cases
in Collins & Galie, supra note 9, at S-9, S-12.
67. See supra note 47.
68. The rate at which state courts are adopting their own constitutional standards distinct
from federal standards is increasing annually. See Collins, Galie, & Kincaid, State High Couds,
State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A JMdicial Suey, 13 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 600-01 (1986).
69. Chief Justice Burger, for one, sought to encourage this reaction while he was on the
Court. In a concurring opinion to a dismissal of a writ of certiorari, he made the controversial
statement that "vhen state courts interpret state law to require more than the Federal Constitu-
tion requires, the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state
law to ensure rational law enforcement." Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). One state court justice has criticized the "arrogance" of this opinion's assump-
tion that federal court standards represent the only approach to "rational law enforcement."
State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 264 (Mont. 1983) (Shea, J., dissenting). For further discussion
of Casal, see infra note 305.
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of similar federal provisions.70 This approach does not force linkage
on the courts, because state judges control conformity with federal
interpretation and can selectively apply it as they see fit.71 This form
of linkage is merely a judicially adopted aid to judicial decisionmaking.
The second type of linkage is that which the electorate imposes
on the courts.7z Many state constitutions provide for amendment
through initiative or referendum. 3 The citizens of two states, Califor-
nia and Florida, have used the amendment process to require their
courts to follow federal search and seizure law. The California provision
accomplishes this objective indirectly by stating that all "relevant evi-
dence" is admissible in criminal proceedings, thus abolishing the state
exclusionary rule (although of course leaving intact the exclusionary
principle to the extent required by the federal Constitution).74 The
Florida provision, on the other hand, explicitly links Florida's search
and seizure and exclusion provisions with the fourth amendment as
construed by the United States Supreme Court.
The impetus for these two provisions was the same. In California,
law enforcement groups were primarily responsible for the drafting
of a number of constitutional measures, ultimately proposed in 1982,
70. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983) (finding that Montana courts are
bound by federal interpretation of federal provisions that are identical to Montana provisions);
Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (linking state and federal
search and seizure provisions); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1980) (in interpreting state constitutions, most states
follow federal interpretations of the federal Constitution).
71. Montana, for instance, has been particularly innovative in this regard. See Collins,
Reliance on State Constitutions - The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1124-30,
1137-39 (1985) (recounting ways in which the Montana Supreme Court has avoided interpreting
its constitution congruently with federal interpretations despite its holding in Jackson, 672 P.2d
at 255 (requiring linkage)). See also infra note 273.
72. Theoretically, at least, the legislature could also impose linkage on the courts. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 933.19(1) (1985) (providing that the United States Supreme Court opinion in
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), is "adopted as the statute law of the state
applicable to searches and seizures under § 12, Art. 1 of the State Constitution"). The legislature,
however, probably could not enact a statute that made future federal decisions the law of the
state. This would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. See infra text accom-
panying notes 342-53.
7.3. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 3, 5; N.Y.
CONST. art. XIX, § 1. "Initiative" refers to a proposal initiated by the populace. "Referendum"
refers to a proposal initiated by the legislature and submitted to the electorate.
74. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). A key difference between the California provision and
the Florida provision is that the former only requires the state courts to follow Supreme Court
decisions concerning the exclusionary remedy whereas the latter requires Florida courts to
follow substantive fourth amendment law as well.
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which came to be called the Victims' Bill of Rights. 75 The pre-vote
literature devoted considerable attention to the exclusionary rule pro-
vision, describing it as a means of counteracting the California courts'
tendency to be "too concerned with rights of defendants. '76 Thus,
approval of the provision was probably in large part a reaction to
perceived state court activism in search and seizure law. 7 Law enforce-
ment groups also initiated Florida's amendment, which was even more
clearly the result of dissatisfaction with state court rulings on search
and seizure law. Because this article's purpose is to assess the impact
of the Florida amendment, it will more closely examine the amend-
ment's antecedents.
B. Florida Search and Seizure Law
Florida's constitution has included a provision protecting against
unreasonable searches and seizures since 1838. 71 Although revised sev-
eral times, 79 all but the two most recent versions of the provision have
been very similar to the fourth amendment.2 The last pre-modern
version, promulgated in 1885 and found in section 22 of the Declaration
of Rights, was virtually identical to the fourth amendments1 In 1927,
thirteen years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
75. The proposal originated with an assistant attorney general and a state senator. The
movement to place the Bill of Rights on the ballot was led by "political conservatives" and
received "widespread support among law-and-order forces, including the California Sheriffs
Association, the California District Attorneys Association, and more than 150 police chiefs."
Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223, 253-54
(1984) (quoting Cochran, Paul Gann's Proposition 8: A 'Victims' Bill of Rights' or a Lawyers'
Employment Act?, 13 CAL. J. 133, 133 (1982)).
76. Id. at 254 n.168.
77. But see Justice Mosk's dissent in In re Lance, 37 Cal. 3d 873, 909-10, 694 P.2d 744,
769, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 656 (1983) (arguing that Victims' Bill of Rights was too complex to
determine whether voters intended to abolish California's exclusionary rule).
78. See FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 7.
79. See FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST.
of 1868, Declaration of Rights, § 19; FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 22; FLA.
CONST. art I, § 12 (1968); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1983).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87, 116-19.
81. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated and no warrants
issued, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched and the person or persons, and thing
or things to be seized.
FLA. Const. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 22.
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Weeks v. United Statess established the exclusionary remedy in the
federal courts, the Florida Supreme Court held that the remedy for
violations of section 22 was exclusion of the seized evidence.8 Florida
thus became one of the twenty-sx states to adopt the exclusionary
remedy as a matter of state law before Mapp required the states to
do so.-
In 1968, the Florida Constitution was revised and a new search
and seizure provision went into effect. The new provision, found in
article I, section 12, differed from older versions in two significant
ways. First, the provision explicitly incorporated the exclusionary re-
medy as a tenet of state constitutional law. This step made the rule
organic rather than a creation of the judiciary, as is the case with the
federal rule.5 Second, the revision added "communications" to the list
of items protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, thus di-
verging from the fourth amendment's language, which refers only to
"persons, houses, papers and effects."
The only version of Florida's search and seizure provision construed
dining the dual federalism period was section 22. Florida courts, like
many other states' courts,88 found the similarity between section 22
and the fourth amendment good reason for following federal precedent
when it was available. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in 1934:
Of course, the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion operates solely upon the actions of the federal govern-
ment and its agents, and is not binding upon the states.
However, our Constitution contains the same provision, and
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are
therefore very persuasive in construing the meaning and
scope of our own constitutional provision.8
82. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
83. Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 138-43, 113 So. 704, 705-06 (1927).
84. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961).
85. The provision states: "Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall
not be admissible in evidence." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1968).
86. See State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983) (state exclusionary rule is "specifically
articulated in our constitution and hence part of organic law," while federal rule is "preeminently
a rule of court and only procedural"). See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)
(federal exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy).
87. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968) ("[tlhe right of the people to be secure...
against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be
violated") with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated").
88. See supra note 30.
89. Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 435, 156 So. 484, 487-88 (1934).
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Accordingly, federal law was often cited in Florida cases * and
usually followed. Apparently, only one Florida court even considered
rejecting relevant federal precedent during the dual federalism
period.9' In dictum in Griffith v. State,- the First District Court of
Appeal found that although wiretapping probably did not violate the
fourth amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
it did violate section 22 of the Florida Constitution.
Mapp and other 1960s' fourth amendment decisions did more than
reinforce the Florida courts' penchant for following federal pronounce-
ments; during this era, Florida courts almost ignored the state search
and seizure provision. From the first decision construing section 22,
in 1909, 93 to Mapp in 1961, 88 percent of the decisions addressing
search and seizure issues relied on state law alone or combined with
federal precedent. But from 1961 until the amendment to article I,
section 12 went into effect in 1983, over two-thirds of Florida's search
and seizure decisions made no mention of the state constitutional pro-
vision, even after the 1968 revision significantly changed the lan-
guage.9' These cases relied on the fourth amendment and federal pre-
90. Roughly half the cases involving search and seizure law decided during the dual
federalism period mention the fourth amendment. This conclusion is based on a combination of
the following WESTLAW searches conducted on October 26, 1987: (1) Date (> 1884 and <
1962) & search & fourth +4 amendment & "section 22"; (2) Date (> 1884 and < 1962) & fourth
+4 amendment & search % "section 22"); and (3) Date (> 1884 and < 1962) & "section 22" &
search % fourth +4 amendment).
91. This conclusion is based on a sampling of the 57 cases decided during this period. See
supra note 90 for the WESTLAW search terms used to find these 57 cases.
92. 111 So. 2d 282, 287 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1959). Technically,
Griffith is not a dual federalism case, since the fourth amendment had been applied to the states
in 1949. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). But it was not until 1961, when Mapp
required that illegally obtained evidence be excluded from state prosecutions, that the states
felt the impact of Wolf. See supra note 23.
93. Lee v. Van Pelt, 57 Fla. 94, 48 So. 632 (1909) (judge adequately followed constitutional
procedures when issuing a search warrant under § 22).
94. This information was obtained from a combination of the followingWESTLAW searches:
(1) Date (> 1961 and < 1968) & fourth +4 amendment & search & "section 22"; (2) Date (>
1961 and < 1968) & fourth +4 amendment & search % "section 22"; (3) Date (> 1961 and <
1968) & "section 22" & search % fourth +4 amendment; (4) Date (> 1967 & fourth +4
amendment & search & "section 12"; (5) Date (> 1967) & fourth +4 amendment & seach %
"section 22"; and (6) Date (> 1967) & "section 12" & search % fourth +4 amendment. A possibly
serious limitation on these searches is that they did not pick up cases that cite only past cases
and not state or federal constitutional provisions. No effort was made to ascertain the number
of such cases.
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cedent. In Florida, as in other states,95 the Warren era stimulated a
significant co-option of state law by federal law.9
On those rare occasions when Florida courts referred to the state
search and seizure provision, they almost always interpreted it to
coincide with federal standards. Indeed, in 1980 the Florida Supreme
Court adopted as its own a lower court opinion concluding that "the
search and seizure provision of the Florida Constitution imposes no
higher standard than that of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. ''97 A few Florida decisions did veer from fourth
amendment rulings, however, relying on the state constitution as a
basis for enunciating more restrictive standards. The first such case
was Grubbs v. State,98 in which the Florida Supreme Court held that
the exclusionary rule applies in probation revocation proceedings. Not-
ing that federal courts had consistently held that illegally seized evi-
dence was admissible at such proceedings, the court nonetheless found
that the Florida Constitution's express statement that unreasonably
obtained evidence "shall not be admissible" required a different re-
sult.9 Although the court also noted that the fourth amendment re-
quired this result, two years later it clearly stated in State v. Dodd1°0
that the holding rested solely on article I, section 12.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
96. Another interesting feature of the post-1961 period, according to the WESTLAW
searches described supra notes 90 & 94, was the tremendous increase in litigation on search
and seizure issues once the Warren revolution had established itself in the late 1960s. Whereas
from 1909 to 1968 Florida courts decided only 81 cases involving search and seizure law, from
1968 until the present they decided 590 such cases, or over six times as many cases in about
one-fourth the time. Some of this increase, however, may be due merely to an increase in the
number of cases officially reported in recent years.
97. State v. Hetland, 366 So. 2d 831, 836 (2d D.C.A.), affd, 387 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1980).
The Florida Supreme Court made a similar statement in its initial opinion in State v. Rickard,
7 Fla. L. Weekly 193, 196 (April 29, 1982) ("[T]he exclusionary rule embodied in the Florida
Constitution [of 1968] was no broader than the federal exclusionary rule."). But that opinion
was Nithdrawn and replaced by a second opinion that was based entirely on federal law. 420
So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982). At least one lower Florida court also linked the state and federal
constitutional provisions. Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974) (1968
constitutional revision recognizing an exclusionary rule was not meant to "enlarge" the exclusio-
nary rule established in Mapp), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975). But see Taylor v. State, 355
So. 2d 180, 184 (3d D.C.A.) ("[E]ven if the federal exclusionary rule is changed, this in no way
affects the fifty year old rule in Florida that evidence seized in violation of Article I, Section
12, of the Florida Constitution is inadmissible in evidence."), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 838 (Fla.
1978).
98. 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979).
99. Id. at 908-09.
100. 419 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 1982).
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A second prominent case repudiating federal precedent was State
v. Sarmiento. 10 In Sarmiento, the Florida Supreme Court held that
placing a body bug on an undercover agent was a search. Responding
to the dissent's argument that the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fourth amendment required the opposite conclu-
sion, °2 the majority observed that "the citizens of Florida, through
their state constitution, may provide themselves with more protection
from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the United States
Constitution. "103
A few other Florida decisions recognized the possibility that Florida
law could diverge from federal standards. 1° But Grubbs, Dodd, Sar-
miento, and two decisions affirming Sarmiento1o 5 were the only opin-
ions that rejected a well established federal standard in favor of a
101. 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
102. See United States v. white, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952). For further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 375-88.
103. 397 So. 2d at 645.
104. See, e.g., Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567, 577 (Fla. 1981) (Sundberg, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Florida's constitutional mandate is more restrictive than its
federal counterpart . . . ."); Croteau v. State, 334 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1976) (Hatchett, J.,
concurring) (article I, § 12 "requires the same result [as the majority opinion reached based on
the fourth amendment], independently of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."); Norman
v. State, 388 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980) (United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980), which abolished automatic standing, "does not preclude a state from utilizing an automatic
standing rule in state court proceedings."). For a discussion of the confusion demonstrated by
Florida courts over the relationship between state and federal search and seizure law, see
Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: An Examination of the Case Law and the Present Posture
of the Florida Supreme Court, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 369 (1982).
105. See, e.g., Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1981) (warrantless recording of defen-
dant's conversation should be excluded), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925 (1982); Hoberman v. State,
400 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1981) ("body bug" evidence should be suppressed). An anomaly in Florida
search and seizure law is Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973), which, eight years before
Sarmiento and six years before Grubbs, seemed to hold that article I, § 12 requires a warrant
in the body bug context even if federal caselaw does not. However, in Tollett the court emphasized
that the state had failed to allow the defendant to cross-examine the "wired" informant, and
indicated that had such cross-examination been allowed and the informant's consent to the wiring
been established, no warrant would have been required. Id. at 495. Thus Tollett arguably went
no further than previous United States Supreme Court rulings, which all involved informants
who had consented to the body bug. See, e.g., United States v. white, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(body bug evidence not suppressed when informant consented); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963) (recording of defendant's conversations with IRS agent admissible). Additionally,
ultimately Tollett may have been an interpretation not of Florida's constitutional search and
seizure provision but of Florida's wiretap statute, FLA. STAT. § 934.01(4) (1985), which allows
electronic eavesdropping when one party to the eavesdrop consents. See Tollett, 272 So. 2d at 494.
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more protective state standard.106 Further, the rejection was timid at
best. Both Grubbs and Dodd emphasized that a person's status as a
probationer could be taken into account in deciding whether a search
was reasonable.107 And within a year of Sarmiento, Florida's lower
appellate courts had severely restricted its scope. 05 Compared to the
New Federalism activism of many state courts, 1 9 Florida court treat-
ment of federal precedent barely deserves mention. Thus it is ironic
that Florida is the only state in the country to adopt a constitutional
amendment explicitly requiring its courts to follow the fourth amend-
ment as the United States Supreme Court construes it; except for
cases concerning the exclusionary rule at probation proceedings and
the use of body bugs, Florida courts showed little intention of doing
otherwise.
Nonetheless, the decisions rejecting federal precedent clearly
triggered the push for the amendment. Law enforcement groups and
legislators were particularly angered by the Sarmiento decision and
saw the amendment as a way to overrule it. 11° Florida Governor Bob
106. Occasionally, a Florida court would apparently take a position relying on state law
that might not have been taken by the United States Supreme Court or another federal court
had it decided the case under the fourth amendment. Compare, e.g., Norman v. State, 379 So.
2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1980) (state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that consent search
is voluntary) with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (voluntariness of a confession need be
proven by only a preponderance of the evidence). Because these types of cases did not reject
an established federal standard, however, they were not like Grubbs or Sarmiento. Cf. infra
text accompanying notes 244-55 (discussing "predictive" stare decisis). Undoubtedly, an occa-
sional Florida case also interpreted the fourth amendment more liberally than a federal court
would have interpreted the amendment had it decided the same case. But again, these types
of decisions did not reject any established federal standard; they were good faith attempts at
interpreting the fourth amendment that may have been wrong. Cf. Meyers v. State, 432 So.
2d 97 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983) (delayed inventory search impermissible under United States
Supreme Court precedents), rev'd sub nor. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984). See also
infra text accompanying notes 355-72 (discussing factual-based conformity). To the extent the
1983 amendment was an attempt to prevent either type of decision by Florida courts, it was
misconceived.
107. Grubbs, 373 So. 2d at 909; Dodd, 419 So. 2d at 335.
108. Several decisions held that Sarrniento did not apply to eavesdropping outside the
home. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 409 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (defendant's truck);
Ruiz v. State, 416 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982) (parking lot); Padgett v. State, 404 So. 2d
151 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (motel room); Pittman v. State, 397 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1981) (restaurant, outdoor rural setting, truck); Morningstar v. State, 405 So. 2d 778 (4th
D.C.A.) (place of business), affd, 428 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1982).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 45-66.
110. Cf. Lipman, Revisions on Crime Win Easily, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 3, 1982, at 1C,
col. 1 (Governor Graham, Attorney General Jim Smith, and a coalition of law enforcement
groups led supporters of amendment, the immediate effect of which was to overturn Sarmiento);
Anderson, Amendment 2 Passes Justices' Review, Florida Times-Union, Nov. 2, 1982, at 1B,
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Graham asked the legislature to adopt the proposed amendment and
place it before the electorate"' on the ground that Florida "should
extend no more rights to those who would break our laws than the
U.S. Constitution would require."11 2 A memorandum that the attorney
general's office submitted to the state legislature asserted, in support
of the amendment:
Florida courts have construed Florida's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures and have applied
Florida's constitutionally based exclusionary rule in a very
broad fashion. Thus, Florida is one of the most restrictive
states in the nation, if not the most, in terms of admissibility
of evidence in criminal proceedings. These restrictive eviden-
tiary standards mean it is much more difficult to convict
criminals in Florida than in other states and our federal
system. 113
Although in view of the minimal activism Florida courts had exhibited
up to that time, 114 these statements are obviously exaggerated, none
of the material officially available to the legislature at the time of its
vote contradicted these assertions."t5
col. 2 ("The primary motive behind the amendment is a desire by the Legislature to overrule
a 1981 Florida Supreme Court decision that prohibits police who do not have search warrants
from using body bugs to monitor conversations inside private homes."); Pudlow, Law Enforce-
ment Proposals Stir Lively Debate, Tallahassee Democrat, Nov. 1, 1982, at 1B, col. 1 (law-en-
forcement officials frustrated that recordings of conversations electronically intercepted by an
officer wearing a body bug are admissible evidence in federal court, but not in state court);
Jenne, Should Voters OK Amendment #2?: Yes: State Presently Is Losing Vital Evidence in
Drug War, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 24, 1982, at H1, col. 1 (article by state senator
arguing that Sarmiento has been "detrimental because [it has] thrown the criminal justice system
into turmoil on the issue of warrantless interceptions.").
111. Florida, like many states, provides for constitutional amendment by referendum, which
involves initiation of the amendment proposal by the state legislature and then submission of
the proposal to the electorate. See inifra note 353.
112. J. FLA. SENATE., Spec. Sess. 1982, at 3 (June 21, 1982).
113. Revised Memorandum, Office of the Att'y Gen., Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Regarding Searches and Seizures and the Exclusionary Rule, at 1 (June 18, 1982) (available in
Fla. St. Archives, Dep't of State, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Revised Memorandum].
114. See supra text accompanying notes 93-109. In support of the statement quoted in the
text, the attorney general's office cited only Sarmiento and Hoberman v. State, 400 So. 2d 758
(Fla. 1981), which reaffirmed Sarmiento. Revised Memorandum, supra note 113, at 3.
115. Only three documents concerning search and seizure issues are available from the state
archives legislative history division for the period immediately preceding the vote on the gover-
nor's proposal: the attorney general's Revised Memorandum, supra note 113, and two documents,
labled "staff analysis," which deal primarily with the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. Letter from Nadine Doty-Tessel, Pub. Serv. Section, Div. of Library and Information
Servs. Fla. St. Archives, to author (Feb. 5, 1987).
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The amendment had an immediate impact. In State v. Lavazzoli 16
shortly after the amendment became effective, the Florida Supreme
Court found that the amendment linked the Florida exclusionary rule
with the federal exclusionary rule, thus removing any independent
protection the state law provides."17 In State v. Ridenour,118 the Third
District Court of Appeal held that Sarmiento did not survive the
amendment, given United States Supreme Court cases to the contrary.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed in State v. Hume.' 19
On at least two occasions, however, Florida courts have refused
to interpret the amendment broadly. In State v. Cross,1 2 the Florida
Supreme Court declined to overrule the Grubbs-Dodd line of cases,
stating that the United States Supreme Court had yet to hold speci-
fically that the exclusionary rule does not apply at probation revocation
proceedings. In State v. SmaUl,121 the Third District Court of Appeal
reaffhmed a 1981 Florida Supreme Court decision requiring that the
owner of a car subject to impoundment be told that impoundment can
be avoided by making other arrangements for the car. The court
rejected the state's argument that United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent required a different result, apparently finding that the Court
had not yet directly addressed the issue. 12
Decisions like Cross and Small notwithstanding, the 1983 amend-
ment to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution has re-oriented
search and seizure law in Florida. It establishes that Florida courts
may not provide any less or any more protection than is afforded
under the fourth amendment as the United States Supreme Court
construes it.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
One conclusion is clear from this synopsis of state court treatment
of federal law. With the advent of incorporation, state courts must
116. 434 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1983).
117. Id. at 323-24 (quoting Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977)).
118. 453 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984).
119. 463 So. 2d 499 (1st D.C.A. 198.5), affd as to relevant part, 512 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1987).
120. 487 So. 2d 1056, 1057-58 (Fla. 1986), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986). See infra
text accompanying notes 247-63 for a more detailed discussion of Cross.
121. 483 So. 2d 783, 784, 788 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986).
122. In Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987), decided after Small, the United States
Supreme Court explicitly held that the owner of an impounded vehicle is not, under the fourth
amendment, entitled to make alternative arrangements for the car.
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interpret state law to provide state citizens with at least as much
protection as federal law affords. Thus, the dual federalism approach
to state constitutional interpretation is untenable. But beyond this
basic tenet, at least three options are available, captured in the rubrics
"co-option," "New Federalism," and "linkage. '' 1
Of the three, a cautious version of the New Federalism best bal-
ances the tradition of federalism with principles of judicial decisionmak-
ing. Co-option is clearly an inappropriate response to the need for a
policy governing state court consideration of federal law. Linkage,
while attractive in some respects, is ultimately repugnant to our notion
of parallel systems of government. Forced linkage of the type Florida
has adopted is especially so. On the other hand, wide-open state ac-
tivism runs counter to judicial decisionmaking goals of clarity, effi-
ciency, and principled reasoning. In short, state courts should be al-
lowed to develop standards more protective than those the federal
courts have produced, but they should be circumspect in doing so.
A. The Case for Presumptive Linkage
Co-option is an inappropriate approach to state court treatment of
federal law because it fails to acknowledge the existence of state
constitutional provisions. Regardless of the meaning of these provis-
ions, their availability as an independent source of law cannot be
denied. As practiced, co-option is most likely the result of unthinking
habit, or of the failure of parties to brief state law, 1' than a policy
reached after conscious evaluation of the role federal decisions should
play in state court analysis.
The difficult question is whether, despite their technical indepen-
dence from federal law, state constitutional provisions should be inter-
123. The following discussion assumes that the state and federal texts are identical in
subject matter, if not in language, as is the case with the search and seizure provisions of most
states. See supra note 28. If there is no analogue to the state provision in the federal Constitution
or no analogue to a federal provision in the state constitution, then speaking of co-option, New
Federalism, or linkage would make little sense, since they all assume some federal standard
from which to depart and some state provision upon which to base the departure. See generally
Collins & Galie, supra note 5, at 328-33 (discussing the "nonequivalent text model" of state
constitutional analysis).
124. See, e.g., Comment, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions
to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 596, 620 n.145 (1979) (lawyers charac-
terize state constitutional law arguments as "garbage argument" and a "last resort"). The
research of professors Collins, Galie, and Kincaid indicates that one reason state constitutional
grounds are not relied upon is that the parties do not argue state constitutional law. See Collins,
Galie, & Kincaid, supra note 68, at 604.
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preted differently from analogous federal provisions. Most commen-
tators and jurists agree that interpretive variance is permissible when
based on something uniquely local.1, Thus, for instance, a significant
difference in the state constitutional provision's language126 or its legis-
lative history,27 may be a proper justification for departure from the
federal interpretation of the analogous federal provision. Similarly, a
distinct local morality is generally a valid reason for diverging from
federal standards.18 Finally, judicial history indicating state court
125. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 364-68, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (1982) (Handler,
J., concurring) (arguing that departure is justified when textual language, legislative history,
preexisting state law, structural differences between state and federal constitutions, matters of
particular state interest or local concern, state traditions, and distinctive attitudes of the state's
citizenry are present); Maltz, supra note 5, at 1013, 1020-23 (although state courts should not
often depart from federal interpretations, significant differences in language of state text or
local morality justify such departures); Shapiro, State Constitutional Doctrine and the Criminal
Process, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 630, 650-54 (1986) (state courts should consider institutional
relationships within the state, and text and history of the state provision); Developments in the
Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1361 (1982)
(listing several kinds of "state-specific factors," including "(1) distinctive provisions of the state
constitution... that characterize particular rights in a significantly different way; (2) distinctive
features of a state's history, particularly circumstances surrounding the adoption of the relevant
state constitutional provision that can be used to guide textual interpretation; (3) previously
established bodies of state law, independent of federal law, that establish or suggest distinctive
state constitutional rights; and (4) distinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry"); Note, supra note
14, at 318-19 (state courts should look at the similarity of the state and federal provisions, the
existence of state precedents, and unique local conditions).
126. Compare New York's right to counsel provision, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person
and with counsel as in civil actions . . . .") with U.S. CONST. amend. VI (extending right to
counsel "in all criminal prosecutions," which the Supreme Court, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979), interpreted to mean that counsel is only required when imprisonment results). See
also supra text accompanying notes 85-87 for a comparison of fourth amendment and 1968
version of Florida's search and seizure provision.
127. See Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So. 2d 651 (1974) (relying on convention
debates and early state precedents to require twelve-person juries contrary to Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970) (based on
extensive examination of state constitutional convention records, right to jury trial attaches at
all trials, not just trials for "serious" offenses, contrary to Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970)); see also Utter, The Right to Freely Speak, Write, and Publish: State Constitutional
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 172-80 (1985) for
an example of an attempt to base a difference in result between state and federal rulings on
legislative history.
128. The best example of this idea is Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), in which
the Alaska Supreme Court established a state constitutional right to private, in-home possession
and use of marijuana by adults. The court relied in part on the observation that Alaska "has
traditionally been the home of people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to
settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control over their own life
style which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister states." Id. at 504.
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adoption of a standard more expansive than a subsequently established
federal standard is clearly a proper basis for ignoring the federal
standard. 129
Beyond these relatively rare situations, the value of the New
Federalism is much in dispute. Three considerations support resistance
to state court judgments that part from federal standards if the basis
for the divergence is pure analysis rather than a local anchor such as
textual or historical differences. First is a desire to avoid the uncer-
tainty and confusion among state officials that might result from having
two countervailing interpretations of the same text. Second is the
notion that having two sets of courts address the same issue is unneces-
sary unless the state courts offer unique insight on the issue based
on local factors. Third is the complaint that state activism that is not
based on local factors is a result-oriented reaction to federal precedent
and therefore unprincipled.
Jurists frequently make the uncertainty argument. For instance,
Chief Justice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court has contended
that law enforcement officers should be able to rely on United States
Supreme Court decisions and not have to guess whether a state court
would interpret a state constitutional provision more expansively than
the identical federal constitutional provision has been interpreted.'"
In the fourth amendment context, the Arizona Supreme Court has
expressed a similar sentiment more pithily, stating "one of the few
things worse than a single exclusionary rule is two different exclusio-
nary rules."'13
The second argument against state court activism, that the dual
review contemplated under the New Federalism unnecessarily shack-
les state legislatures and officials, is most forcefully presented by
Professor Maltz.132 The dual layer of review is unnecessary, he argues,
because state courts are no better situated than federal courts to
interpret constitutional language, except when textual differences,
legislative history, or local morality create special considerations under
state law. In all other circumstances, contends Maltz, neither the
129. See, e.g., People v. Paulsen, 198 Colo. 458, 601 P.2d 634 (1979) (rejecting United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), on the basis of state precedent); People v. Cunningham,
49 N.Y.2d 203, 209-10, 400 N.E.2d 360, 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1980) (holding that in New
York, contrary to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), waiver of right to counsel is valid
only if counsel is present, based on state court recognition of right to counsel long before federal
right to counsel was established).
130. See 666 P.2d 135, 149-50 (Colo. 1983) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting).
131. State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 268, 689 P.2d 519, 527 (1984).
132. See Maltz, supra note 5, at 1005-06.
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 676 1987
FLORIDA'S "FORCED LINKAGE"
competence '33 nor the institutional traits M of the state courts distin-
guish them from the federal courts enough to merit allowing them
independent review of constitutional issues and burdening state legis-
lation with another judicial hurdle.
Both the uncertainty argument and the unnecessary review argu-
ment are reasons for leaning toward linkage. But they do not persua-
sively support the conclusion that linkage should be required as is the
case in Florida and California. Uncertainty is a fact of constitutional
adjudication, particularly in the criminal procedure area. Even if state
courts were bound to the federal standard, disputes would arise over
the meaning of most decisions.135 State officers would still be confronted
with a complex array of rules in these cases. Further, even when
clear standards are attainable, the claim that uncertainty results when
two different court systems address the same issue is easily exagger-
ated. Unless a state court announces a more protective standard, the
federal minimum applies. In those rare instances when the state court
arrives at a different standard, that standard will control. In short,
only one standard will apply to state officials at any given time.
The "duplication-of-review" argument is also not a persuasive
reason for requiring linkage. As Maltz concedes, the duplication argu-
ment loses its force when the text of the state constitution is signific-
antly different from the federal text, when state legislative history
differs from the intent behind the federal provision, or when local
morality diverges from national morality. Yet forced linkage binds
state courts to federal precedent even in these situations. For example,
that the Florida Constitution specifically protects communications is
probably irrelevant now that the 1983 amendment to article I, section
12 requires Florida courts to follow Supreme Court precedent. s
133. Id. at 1011-12 (pointing out that analysis of state court judges is just as fallible as the
analysis of the United States Supreme Court).
134. Id. at 1016-23 (decisionmaking processes of both state and federal courts are "virtually
identical," and state court geographical proximity to issue will rarely result in justifiable di-
vergence from federal standard).
135. For instance, in the fourth amendment area alone, Professor Bradley has identified
over 20 exceptions to the probable cause or warrant requirements or both, derived solely from
United States Supreme Court opinions. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985). See also infra text accompanying notes 355-67 for a
discussion of the Court's penchant for adopting totality of the circumstances analysis in fourth
amendment cases. This multi-factor approach makes clarity virtually impossible.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20 for a discussion of post-amendment treatment
of Sanniento. But see infra note 204.
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More important, forced linkage is inappropriate even when differ-
ences between federal and state language or between federal and state
history are minimal. Admittedly, in this situation state courts may be
no better equipped to exercise judicial review than federal courts, and
should therefore be inclined to accept federal interpretation. But there
are three related reasons for permitting, if not encouraging, state
courts to diverge from federal precedent even when the reason for
doing so is not among those Maltz identifies.
First, federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court, may be
constrained in interpreting particular constitutional language because
their rulings govern more than one state. For example, the Supreme
Court might construe the fourth amendment quite differently if freed
from the spectre of requiring exclusion in all fifty states every time
it announces a new fourth amendment principle. 137 Professor Sager
has persuasively argued that the underenforcement that may result
from this type of institutional pressure on the Supreme Court justifies
more expansive state court interpretations. as Non-judicial considera-
137. Some members of the Court have been explicit about federalism concerns in some
contexts. See, e.g., Crist v. Brest, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing
view that double jeopardy clause can be more stringent when applied to federal rather than
state action); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing
in a case involving the scope of the jury trial right that the incorporation doctrine has contributed
to the "dilution of federal rights").
Although the Court has never said as much in the fourth amendment context, the implication
is found in many of its opinions. For instance, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the
Court stated that allowing state criminal defendants to raise fourth amendment claims (as
opposed to "guilt-related" claims) in federal habeas courts "results in serious intrusions on values
important to our system of government," including "the minimization of friction between our
federal and state systems of justice, and ... the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon
which the doctrine of federalism is founded." Id. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Court has also spoken repeatedly of the
"cost" of excluding evidence, in a way that suggests that the number of cases in which exclusion
occurs is a primary factor in the Court's decisions to limit the scope of the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978) ("substantial social cost" of exclusionary
rule includes considering "misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who
may invoke that rule... when deciding whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment
violations"); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984); United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974).
This preoccupation with the number of cases affected by a given fourth amendment ruling could
very easily lead members of the Supreme Court, consciously or unconsciously, to refuse to adopt
a fourth amendment standard that they would have no trouble adopting were it to apply only
in the federal courts.
138. See Sager, Fair Meosure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1242-63 (1978). Sager's argument technically only justifies more expan-
sive state court interpretation of the federal Constitution. But his underenforcement contention
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tions that are irrelevant to the state should not drive state constitu-
tional law.
Second, linkage denies federal and state courts the benefit of the
state court's reasoning on the proper interpretation of particular lan-
guage. Such reasoning has played a valuable role in the past. At times,
state court reasoning has proven influential even at the United States
Supreme Court level. 1:9
Finally, linkage prevents the experimentation of which Justice
Brandeis spoke so fondly in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman.140 According
to Brandeis:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 1
41
This refrain, which has appeared in many Supreme Court opinions, 142
is particularly germane when speaking of the rights of the criminal
accused. As Judge Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
pointed out, state constitutional provisions concerning criminal proce-
dure are "less encrusted with layers of court decisions . . ." than the
also provides a persuasive reason for allowing state courts to interpret similar state constitutional
language more expansively. See also Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353, 396-97 (1984)
("state courts should always suspect federalism concerns, whether expressed or not, as a con-
tributing factor to the Supreme Court's decision against the asserted federal constitutional
right.").
139. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (justifying imposition of the exclusio-
nary rule on the states in part because over half the states had already seen fit to adopt the
rule partially or wholly); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1955) (relying on conclusions reached
by state courts in finding that indigents are entitled to a free trial record on appeals as of
right). See also Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1025, 1040 (1985) ("rhe Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the variety,
breadth, and depth of state court analysis by frequent resort to such analysis in its own deci-
sions.").
140. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
141. Id. at 311.
142. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 n.20 (1977); Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 296 (1947).
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federal counterpart and thus allow state courts "to rethink the funda-
mental issues.'143
For these reasons,144 duplicative review can fulfill an important
role, even when local interpretation factors are absent. But it still
might be viewed as improper because it encourages unprincipled de-
cisionmaking. The third argument against state court activism, that
it is often result-oriented, is the most prevalent. Many commentators 4 "
view the current renaissance in state constitutional litigation as an
ideological reaction to the retrenchment of the United States Supreme
Court, rather than as an objective effort to develop state constitutional
doctrine.
One response to this criticism might be that all judicial decisions
that part with precedent are by definition result-oriented. One does
not have to be an advocate of the critical legal studies movement,1
to believe that ideology exerts a greater influence over judicial deci-
143. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1181.
144. Williams suggests additional reasons why state court review might be legitimate and
useful despite a relevant United States Supreme Court ruling. These reasons include the state
courts' greater authority vis-d-vis the legislative and executive branches, their lighter docket
load (producing an enhanced ability to fine-tune decisions), their greater accountability, and
their greater experience with certain types of issues. Williams, supra note 138, at 397-400.
145. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, All Said and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979) (criticizing the California
Supreme Court for result-oriented decisionmaking); Martineau, Review Essay, The Status of
State Government Law in Legal Education, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 511, 516 (1984) ("It is significant
that this interest [in state constitutional law] arises not from an acknowledgment that state
constitutions are by their very nature important but simply from a result-oriented jurisprudence
that views a state constitutional provision as an alternate vehicle for achieving a result that
previously could be obtained under a federal constitutional claim."); Note, supra note 14, at 297
("[S]tate courts are evading Supreme Court doctrine and engaging in unprincipled, result-
oriented use of their state constitutions.").
146. Although defining the essence of the so-called critical legal studies movement is pro-
blematic, two principal tenets adopted by most who claim to be part of the movement are that
identifying a moral or legal "absolute" is impossible and that law is a product of political and
economic allegiances. See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 125
(1984) (regularities in interpretation and application of legal rules not necessary consequences
of adoption of given regime of rules; shift in direction of political winds could lead to exactly
opposite results); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 39 (1984) ("Since legal reasoning includes and systematizes all of the conflicting arguments
that people find plausible, there is no reason to expect it to provide a basis for decisionmaking
that transcends these ordinary value conflicts."); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduc-
tion to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEG. ED. 505, 508 (1986) ("Decision-makers are
an elite, demographically unrepresentative and socialized into a set of beliefs about society and
technology that skew the balance that they reach.").
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 680 1987
FLORIDA'S "FORCED LINKAGE"
sions than do neutral principles.147 Certainly one could conclude that
the United States Supreme Court's recent rulings on criminal proce-
dure portray excessive preoccupation with reaching results that favor
the prosecution at the expense of long settled doctrine.14
A less cynical response to the claim that state court activism is
result-oriented is that it overlooks the possibility that a judicial deci-
sion can be principled simply because it is analytically persuasive. A
state court decision does not have to rely on state constitutional lan-
guage, history, or precedent to meet this requirement.14 State courts
should not have to accept flawed federal court reasoning. If a state
147. See Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-Philosophical Project, 28 WBa. &
MARY L. REV. 205, 206 (1987) ("[T]he relation between morality and politics envisioned by
liberal political philosophy is impossible to achieve. [Rawls, Ackerman, Dworkin have failed] in
portraying a politics that is neutral or impartial among the basic differences - in particular
among the competing conceptions of human good - that constitute the moral dissensus of our
pluralistic society."); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-21 (1983) (advocates of neutral principles
have conceded so many limitations on the doctrine as to make it meaningless). Even Wechsler,
one of the principal advocates of the neutral principle concept, conceded that areas remain where
courts cannot develop general principles. Wechsler, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW
AND PHILOSOPHY 290, 299 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
148. Stone has argued, for instance, that the 1983 Term of the Court showed a particularly
"aggressive majoritarianism" that signaled a significant shift from the Warren era. See generally
Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarianisn: A Court in Transition, 19 GA.
L. REV. 15 (1984). He concludes that
the Court in the 1983 Term sided with the government in a higher percentage of
first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and fourteenth amendment cases than in
any term in the past half century, with the sole exception of the 1938 Term, when
the Court was in the throes of dismantling economic substantive due process.
Id. at 17-18. He also concludes that "many of the Court's decisions in the 1983 Term break
sharply with the Court's own precedents or with a substantial consensus of opinion in the lower
courts." Id. at 18. Evidence of result-oriented jurisprudence from the Court is not confined to
the 1983 Term. See Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 16 STETON HALL L. REV. 597, 626-28 (1986) (arguing that South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), "demonstrates how the bright-line rules of the warrant clause
can be eroded by a result-oriented court."). See generally Whitebread, supra note 47.
149. Several commentators have made this point. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1180 (dis-
agreeing "with those who suggest that interpreting the state constitution independently of the
federal constitution is an unprincipled pro-defendant, result-oriented process"); Dix, Exclusio-
nary Rule Issues as Matters of State Law, 11 AT. J. CRIBI. L. 109, 125-26 (1983) (no intrinsic
reason for calling a federal result more '"principled" than a state result); Developments in the
Law, supra note 125, at 1360 ("[D]isagreement with federal argumentation can be just as
principled as any other judicial reasoning (and . . . reliance on other grounds for divergence,
such as state-specific factors, can be at least as manipulative as direct criticism of federal
results).").
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court's result differs from the federal courts' after careful analysis and
convincing reasoning, it should not be called result-oriented. 15
This conclusion does not mean that state court independence should
be unbounded. In particular, state courts should examine closely the
premise of the federal position before deciding to adopt a different
stance. A state court that strikes out on its own path without giving
due deliberation to relevant federal precedent is also likely to be
forsaking judicial neutrality. This type of decisionmaking is much more
likely to create uncertainty and suggest the type of institutional defi-
ciency that prompts criticism of duplicative review.'5 ' But if the state
court deals with federal precedent and persuasively demonstrates that
federal court reasoning is unacceptable, its result can no more be
called unprincipled than can the original federal holding. In short, the
more the state court gives careful attention to federal doctrine, the
less concerned one should be about the objectivity of a result that
rejects that doctrine.
B. A Case Study
The Mississippi Supreme Court's original opinion in Stringer v.
State'52 (Stringer 1) typifies the reasoning that can legitimize state
repudiation of a federal standard. The opinion, written by Justice
Robertson, declined as a matter of state law to adopt the United
States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Leon,"3 which
interpreted the fourth amendment to allow the introduction of evidence
seized pursuant to an invalid warrant if, at the time of its seizure,
150. It is probable that the real reason many have called state activism result-oriented is
that they disagree with particular results reached by state courts. See Williams, supra note
138, at 357-58.
151. Some have argued for a "self-reliant" approach to state constitutional interpretation,
an approach that considers federal reasoning, if at all, as merely one instructive source of
reasoning. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Linde, supra note 70, at 392-93. To the extent
the self-reliant approach encourages state courts to ignore relevant federal precedent, it "can
result in questionable and unstable reasoning." Developments in the Law, supra note 125, at
1364.
152. No. 54,806 (Miss. 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Miss. file). On petition for rehearing,
the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion in Stringer and substituted a second
opinion upholding the result, but on a different ground. 491 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1986). The original
opinion, written by Justice Robertson, became the concurring opinion in the second Stringer
decision. For ease of reference, page numbers in the following notes are from the concurring
opinion.
153. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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the seizing officer believed in good faith that the warrant was valid.
Justice Robertson's grounds for rejecting Leon's holding illustrate the
different bases upon which a state court may properly establish a
state standard more protective than the federal rule.
The first ground advanced in Stringer I for rejecting Leon focused
on explicit differences between federal and state law. Justice
Robertson noted that the exclusionary rule has been a recognized facet
of Mississippi law since 1922,154 and that state cases since then have
continuously affirmed, even after Mapp, the availability of the exclusio-
nary sanction under state law.-' These facts alone justify a decision
to reject Leon's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Missis-
sippi's pre-Mapp judicial history establishes the state's independent
interest in excluding illegally seized evidence, regardless of how federal
courts choose to sanction illegal searches.
The Stringer I court also based its position on a perception that
local systemic tendencies differed from those influencing the United
States Supreme Court. Justice Robertson found that the good faith
exception in Leon "more reflects a shift in judicial/political ideology
than a judicial response to demonstrable and felt societal needs.1' 56 In
Mississippi, at least, no such societal needs were demonstrable. Justice
Robertson noted that only once in thirteen years had the Mississippi
Supreme Court used the exclusionary rule to keep out evidence police
had seized under a groundless warrant. 57 He also pointed out that
the effect of Leon could be particularly insidious in Mississippi "where
most judges issuing warrants have had no formal legal training."'1
Finally, Stringer I attacked Leon's logic. The majority in Leon had
justified its holding with a cost-benefit analysis. On the one hand, it
reasoned, the loss of convictions due to a blanket exclusionary rule is
significant. On the other hand, exclusion would not deter officers acting
in good faith reliance on a warrant, and would be unnecessary to deter
the magistrate issuing the warrant, assuming the necessary detach-
ment from the law enforcement process. 15 9 This analysis did not per-
154. 491 So. 2d at 847 (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211,
223, 90 So. 845, 84548 (1922)).
155. Id. at 847-48 (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing, e.g., Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427,
434 n.3 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Armstrong v. State, 195 Miss. 300,
303-04, 15 So. 2d 438, 439 (1944)).
156. Id. at 850 (Robertson, J., concurring).
157. Id. The one case was Washington v. State, 382 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1980).
158. 491 So. 2d at 850.
159. 468 U.S. at 920-21.
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suade Justice Robertson. He pointed to the Supreme Court's own
statistics for the proposition that exclusion of evidence actually aborts
few prosecutions. 160 He also noted that the benefit of exclusion is
substantial because it motivates the magistrate to carefully calculate
probable cause. Conversely, if the good faith rule of Leon were
adopted, the magistrate would have little incentive to act properly.
A warrant is obtained in an ex parte proceeding from which there is
no appeal. 16' Moreover, because of judicial immunity, the magistrate
does not experience even the slim deterrent effect that fear of civil
liability produces. 1
Ultimately, however, the Stringer I court grounded its decision
not on cost-benefit concerns but on what it considered the "fundamen-
tal logic of the exclusionary rule."' Justice Robertson asserted that
the exclusionary rule is meant to return the parties to the position
they were in before the illegal search and seizure,'- citing Nix v.
Williams,16 a recent United States Supreme Court decision that relied
on this proposition in addressing the scope of the exclusionary rule in
the derivative evidence context. Because the good faith exception
violates this precept, it cannot be countenanced. The Stringer I court
also restated its adherence to the rationale for the exclusionary rule
advanced in Weeks v. United States, lfand endorsed by the Mississippi
Supreme Court when it established the state exclusionary rule in
1922.167 Weeks held that admitting illegally obtained evidence "would
be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open
defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution."18
160. 491 So. 2d at 849-50 (Robertson, J., concurring). The Leon Court had noted that the
exclusionary rule "results in the nonprosecution of between 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals
arrested for felonies." 468 U.S. 807 n.6.
161. 491 So. 2d at 849 (Robertson, J., concurring).
162. Id. (Robertson, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 850 (Robertson, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-43 (1984)).
165. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that evidence that would have inevitably been discovered
through proper police action is not inadmissible because actually found as a result of police
misconduct).
166. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
167. See Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922).
168. 232 U.S. at 394. Justice Robertson also pointed out that the Supreme Court's decision
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), which emphasized that the probable cause standard is
a flexible one, made Leon unnecessary; he noted: "For the vast majority of situations, it would
appear that the Supreme Court in Gates and Leon has killed one bird with two stones." 491
So. 2d at 850 (quoting State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 822, 693 P.2d 458, 468 (Ct. App. 1984))
(emphasis added by Robertson, J.).
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Sthriger I exemplifies a state court's use of state precedent, local
morality, and logical refutation to justify a position different from the
United States Supreme Court's. The logical component of its attack
on Leon is of particular interest. Justice Robertson's opinion evaluated
the good faith exception in terms already recognized by the federal
courts. He engaged in cost-benefit analysis, as had Leon, and relied
on the reasoning not only of Weeks, but of the Court's recent decision
in Nix v. Williams. The opinion thus reaches its contrary decision
within the parameters previous federal law had sketched out. Although
concern about creating uncertainty and engaging in unnecessary dup-
lication of review should make a state court cautious about rejecting
federal precedent, it should not prevent principled state court analysis
of the type Stringer I illustrates.
C. Summary
Forced linkage is bad policy because it undercuts state court analyt-
ical independence, thus compromising the ability of state courts to
reflect local legal and moral preferences, fully enforce constitutional
guarantees, stimulate thought among other courts, and experiment
with important concepts. Unlimited state activism is also bad policy
because it promotes uncertainty, questionable duplication of review,
and result-oriented jurisprudence. Presumptive linkage is the prefer-
able approach to state court treatment of federal law. State courts
should not lightly repudiate a federal ruling, but they should be free
to do so when state precedent, local morality, or careful analysis
suggests that the federal standard should not be adopted as the state
standard.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE FLORIDA AMENDMENT
For the reasons stated above, the 1983 amendment to article I,
section 12 should be repealed. The amendment's requirement that
search and seizure law in Florida conform to United States Supreme
Court decisions construing the fourth amendment irresponsibly in-
fringes upon the independence of Florida's courts.16 9
169. Arguably the 1983 amendment is repugnant to another section of the Florida Constitu-
tion. Article V, § 1 provides that "[tihe judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court,
district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may be established
by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1. The effect
of the 1983 amendment, it could be said, is to surrender Florida judicial power, in violation of
article V, § 1, to the United States Supreme Court whenever a decision of that Court governs
the issue in a Florida search and seizure case.
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If the amendment is not repealed, it can and should be interpreted
narrowly. The same reasons that make forced linkage bad policy also
justify limiting its impact when it cannot be avoided altogether.
The key question posed by the amendment is whether a Florida
decision on search and seizure law conforms with United States Su-
preme Court decisions on the fourth amendment. The conformity ques-
tion requires a two-step analysis. First, state courts must determine
whether a United States Supreme Court decision exists that controls
the case at hand. If not, then Florida courts may develop their own
standard. If so, the courts must determine how to achieve conformity
with the Supreme Court's rule. 170
The force of this argument is reduced by principles of constitutional construction, however.
First, if possible, constitutional provisions are to be read in harmony with one another. See
State v. Division of Bond Fin. of Dep't of Gen. Servs., 278 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 1973); Jackson
v. Consolidated Gov't of Jacksonville, 225 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Fla. 1969) ("Unless the later
amendment expressly repeals or purports to modify an existing provision, the old and the new
should stand and operate together unless the clear intent of the later provision is thereby
defeated."). Second, if an amendment and earlier provisions of the constitution are irreconciliable,
the amendment prevails. See, e.g., Wilson v. Crews, 160 Fla. 169, 34 So. 2d 114 (1948); State
v. Special Tax School Dist., 107 Fla. 93, 144 So. 356 (1932); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Board
of Comm'rs, 58 Fla. 391, 50 So. 574 (1909). A final factor that supports the constitutionality of
article I, § 12 (but that ultimately significantly curtails its impact) is that, as detailed below,
see in particular infra note 170, Florida courts remain to a large extent the ultimate arbiters
of search and seizure law in Florida despite the 1983 amendment.
170. Because it stems from the state constitution, the conformity question, in both its
aspects, should be considered an issue of Florida law. Thus, a Florida court determination that
its decision is in conformity with the fourth amendment as construed by the Supreme Court
should be considered an adequate and independent state ground for the judgment that bars
Supreme Court jurisdiction over the judgment. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,
210 (1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 634-35 (1874). The argument
could be made that such a judgment is not really 'independent" of federal law because it requires
an interpretation of federal law. See Collins, supra note 71, at 1115 (when interpretations of
state constitution are "linked inextricably" to United States Supreme Court opinions, "all state
decisions are potential candidates for federal review"); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
652-53 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977))
(because state court "felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional consider-
ations to construe ... its own law in the manner it did," Supreme Court can review Delaware
court's interpretation of state law). But this argument should be discounted in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions suggesting that a state court interpretation of a state statute that
requires construction of federal law is an adequate and independent state ground for the state
court judgment. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942) (California Supreme
Court's finding that a post exchange is not an agency of the United States under federal law
is in error; whether this error means that state statute exempting agencies of the United States
from license tax applies to post exchanges is up to California court); State Tax Comm'n v. Van
Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939) (Utah Supreme Court's finding that federal salaries are immune from
taxation under federal Constitution erroneous; state court is still the authority in deciding
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In deciding the two aspects of the conformity question, state courts
should not lightly discard the values associated with state court
sovereignty that have been described. Florida courts should surrender
their judicial independence only when clear Supreme Court precedent
governs the case at hand. Even if they find applicable Supreme Court
precedent, courts should heed state tradition, local morality, and the
persuasiveness of the Court's opinion when deciding how to conform
to it.171
An objection to such a narrow interpretation of the amendment is
that it violates the intent of the amendment's drafters and ratifiers.
It is well established in Florida that the intent of a constitutional
provision, as determined by the legislature's intent in proposing it and
the people's intent in adopting it, should govern its interpretation.172
Although no official legislative history of the amendment exists,"73 its
whether state statute exempting salaries from the United States applies to petitioner). These
decisions indicate that, at most, the Supreme Court could review a Florida decision to clarify
the proper interpretation of federal law, thereafter leaving it up to Florida courts to make the
ultimate decision concerning conformity.
If a Florida court judgment on the conformity question completely misconstrues Supreme
Court precedent, it is conceivable that it could be characterized as "inadequate," even though
independent. But the prevailing analytical approach to the adequacy prong prohibits Supreme
Court review of a state court judgment based on an independent state ground unless the
judgment represents an effort to "evade" the command of federal law. Demorest v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 64 S. Ct. 384, 388 (1944). See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, &
E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 747-54 § 4029 (1977) (discussion of the
relevant caselaw). Thus a good faith Florida court assessment of the conformity issue should
not be reversible by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that it will exercise jurisdiction over a state
court judgment unless the state court makes clear that it is basing its judgment on state law
rather than federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Thus, if a Florida court does
not make a plain statement to the effect that its judgment is based on an interpretation of the
conformity clause of article I, § 12, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine will
not bar Supreme Court review of a Florida search and seizure decision.
171. For the reasons stated supra note 170, when a Florida court does make a decision on
the conformity issue, it should clearly state that it is interpreting article I, § 12 of the Florida
Constitution.
172. State v. State Bd. of Admin., 157 Fla. 360, 25 So. 2d 880, 884 (1946) (en banc). See
ge)Zerally 10 FLA. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law §§ 22-26 (1979) ("[Tlhe fundamental object in
construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers
and adopters thereof, and constitutional provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as to
fulfill this intention, rather than to defeat it.").
173. The amendment was part of an "anti-crime" package offered by Governor Graham
during a special legislative session called to deal primarily with the issue of redistricting. See
Weiner, Should Voters OK Amendment #2: No: That Proposal Would Dilute Constitutional
Protection, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun Sentinel, Oct. 24, 1982, at 1H, col. 4. The amendment
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proponents, as noted earlier,174 wanted to curb Florida court activism
and reduce restrictions on police investigation. Moreover, to the extent
legislators and voters were aware of the amendment's import, 175 they
too probably saw it as a means of facilitating conviction of criminal
defendants. 176 As a result, one could argue that Florida courts must
opt for the crime control- position in analyzing the conformity issue.
passed without debate. Id. at 6H, col. 1. The only legislative deliberation relevant to the proposal
was testimony taken by the Florida legislature on a nearly identical, earlier version of the
proposal. See id. at 1H, col. 4. After this testimony, the Florida Senate rejected the earlier
proposal by a vote of 20-18. J. FLA. SENATE Reg. Sess. 1982, at 451 (Mar. 15, 1982).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 110-15.
175. Ascertaining the "intent" of the legislature and the electorate, especially the intent of
the latter, is notoriously difficult. Although newspapers are one source of inference about voter
intent, see infra note 176, it cannot be assumed that voters read the newspapers' description
of the amendment or rely upon that description in deciding how to vote. It is possible that
many Florida citizens did not have an accurate idea of the amendment's purpose. For instance,
a recent national survey shows that 85% of those polled believe that all important state court
judgments can be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Marcus, Constitution Confuses
Most Americans, The Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at A13, col. 1. If this percentage holds
true in Florida, the amendment may have passed because the voters thought it merely con-
stitutionalized standard practice. This would be a vast misunderstanding of the amendment's
purpose. For further discussion of possible nuances in the voters' intent, see infra text accom-
panying notes 342-46.
176. Most newspaper articles and editorials preceding and subsequent to the vote - in
addition to describing the proposed amendment as a means of overturning State v. Sarmiento,
397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981), see supra note 110 and accompanying text - also noted the claim
by the amendment's supporters that the proposal would relax restrictions on the police and cut
down on crime. See, e.g., Ollove, Fear of Crime Shows in State's Amendment Votes, Miami
Herald, Nov. 4, 1982, at 22A, col. 1 (quoting director of Florida Sheriffs Ass'n, who stated
that amendment 'Is a reflection that [the voters are] fed up with crime," and American Civil
Liberties Union lawyer, who stated: "If you were for keeping the status quo, you would vote
'no."'); Our Views, in Capsule of the General Election, Fla. Times-Union, Oct. 31, 1982, at F-2,
col. 1 (The amendment "would lessen the opportunities of criminals walking free from their
crimes because of legal technicalities while at the same time providing citizens with ample
protection against abuse of police search and seizure powers."); Amendment Offers Reasonable
Change, Ft. Lauderdale News & Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 30, 1982, at 22A, col. 1 ("The amendment
would make the criminal justice system in Florida more effective."); Reider, State Voters to
Have Say on Bail, Evidence, Measure Would Broaden Law Enforcement Rights, Miami Herald,
Oct. 28, 1982, at 1A, col. 4 (quoting the attorney for the state Senate secretary, who saw
amendment as a referendum on whether Florida courts should "be allowed to continue on what
is perceived as a 'liberal' course, or ... be required to adopt the current 'conservative' approach
of the federal courts").
177. The phrase "crime control" is borrowed from H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIAI-
INAL SANCTION, ch. 8 (1968). Professor Packer distinguished between the crime control model
of criminal procedure and a due process model. Advocates of a crime control stance are primarily
concerned with accurate determinations of guilt, whereas those who favor a due process model
are more willing to sacrific convictions to protect other values. Id.
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When there is no Supreme Court precedent, Florida courts should
nonetheless fashion a decision with the crime control model in mind.
When such precedent exists, but there is some degree of flexibility
in deciding how to apply that precedent, Florida courts should choose
the most prosecution-oriented approach.
This crime control argument is flawed, however. That legislators
and voters may generally want to remove impediments to law enforce-
ment does not mandate results in particular cases, even assuming this
desire represents local moralityY78 Before legislative and electorate
intent can govern judicial decisionmaking, the legislators' and voters'
wishes with respect to the precise search and seizure issue before the
court must be determined. Given a concrete fact situation, these
groups might very likely be willing to accord privacy interests greater
weight than concern for the criminal element. Yet determining how
Florida citizens would resolve a given search and seizure dispute would
be futile, with the possible exception of the body bug issue addressed
in Sarmiento, which was highly publicized before the vote on the
amendment.17 Absent this information, Florida courts need not adopt
a crime control approach to a particular search and seizure issue unless
the United States Supreme Court has clearly done so.
The crucial first question, then, is whether the Supreme Court has
adopted a standard that Florida courts must follow. Section A below
discusses the situations in which a Florida court could reasonably
conclude that no Supreme Court decision governs. In these situations,
stare decisis is inapplicable and cautious activism of the type discussed
178. Although the wishes of the legislature and the electorate are relevant in discerning
the content of 'local morality," they are not necessarily dispositive. Professor Perry has argued
that morality is as much the province of the courts as it is the domain of the legislature and
the electorate, at least when ambiguous constitutional provisions are being interpreted. Perry,
The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985). Because courts are "relatively disinterested" observers of the
community, id. at 573, deal in concrete cases rather than abstract possibilities, id. at 573-74,
and possess a "far more self-critical political morality," id. at 575, they are better equipped to
discern society's aspirations than the legislature. While recognizing that this stance may be
viewed by some as violating the notion of popular sovereignty, Professor Perry points out that
an equally strong tradition in this country has been 'liberty and justice for all." Id. at 577.
Although the courts may not be the best way of effectuating the first tradition, they are probably
the best mechanism for achieving the second. Id. at 575-85. If one agrees with Perry's position,
it would be inaccurate to state that the legislature's and electorate's desire for a "crime control"
interpretation of article I, § 12 determines the 'local morality" concerning search and seizure,
at least when that desire is expressed ambiguously, as the text below argues it was.
179. See supra note 110.
689
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 689 1987
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA TV REVIEW
previously is appropriate. If a Supreme Court decision does govern
the case, the second question is whether the result that the Florida
court reaches conforms to that decision. Section B below explores the
implications of the New Federalism for Florida courts addressing the
second question. Both of these questions deal with the precedential
value of Supreme Court opinions. Because the 1983 amendment in
effect makes Florida courts lower federal courts for purposes of search
and seizure law, a detailed analysis of the extent to which a lower
court must follow a decision issued by a superior court is necessary.
A. When Supreme Court Precedent Is Not Binding
Arguably, Florida courts may disregard four types of United States
Supreme Court decisions construing the fourth amendment, despite
the commands of article I, section 12. First, when the Supreme Court
decision is not an authoritative opinion of the Court (e.g., a plurality
opinion), it binds no lower court. Second, when an authoritative Su-
preme Court opinion is only partially based on the fourth amendment,
article I, section 12 may not require conformity. Third, when the
Supreme Court ruling provides less protection than is provided under
a Florida constitutional provision other than article I, section 12, or
under Florida statutory law, it may be ignored. Fourth, and most
controversially, Florida courts might not have to follow a Supreme
Court opinion handed down after the vote on the amendment.
1. The Absence of an Authoritative Opinion
When no relevant Supreme Court decision on a search and seizure
issue exists, Florida courts are free to develop their own standard
based on the state constitution. Even when relevant Supreme Court
language construes the fourth amendment, courts need not necessarily
follow that language if it is not an authoritative opinion on the issue
before the Florida court. If a Supreme Court construction of the fourth
amendment does not bind a federal court, then it should not bind
Florida courts either, despite article I, section 12.
Determining whether an opinion is binding calls into play the prin-
ciple of stare decisis and the idea that like cases should be decided
alike. 1 0 The stare decisis principle has four primary objectives. First
180. Stare decisis has been defined as the "[d]octrine that, when [the] court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are substantially the same." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979) (citing to Home v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940)).
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is predictability; one should be able to rely on previous decisions as
an accurate statement of the law to permit planning of one's affairs
accordingly. Second is the goal of uniformity; ideally the same case
will be treated alike in each jurisdiction to prevent a sense of arbitrar-
iness or disparity. A third goal of the stare decisis principle is to
affirm the judicial hierarchy; lower courts should follow superior
courts, on the theory that superior courts are better equipped to
decide issues of law, and because uniformity is more easily achieved
in this way. Finally, a fourth goal is to improve judicial decisionmaking
capacity; by ensuring that present decisionmakers consider the reason-
ing of previous decisionmakers, more objective and reliable decisions
should follow.81 All of these goals - predictability, uniformity, judicial
allegiance, and reliability - are relevant to the following attempt to
define judicial authoritativeness.
This article discusses three categories of nonbinding opinions: plur-
ality decisions, dicta, and inferences derived from authoritative opin-
ions on related matters."? When a Supreme Court pronouncement falls
into one of these three categories, a Florida court may disregard it
and announce a state standard that is either more, or less, protective
of privacy rights than the language found in the Supreme Court's
opinion.
a. Plurality Opinions
The traditional wisdom concerning a plurality opinion is that, be-
cause it has not commanded a majority of the Court, other courts do
not have to follow it. 1  This statement is too simplistic. One must
first distinguish between the result of a plurality opinion and the
rationales offered for that result. Then one must closely examine the
181. Three of these four objectives - predictability, uniformity and reliability - are gleaned
from Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 55 (1979) (predictability, uniformity,
deliberateness, correctness, impersonality, objectivity, and efficiency of judicial decisionmaldng
are goals of stare decisis). See also E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 392 (rev. ed. 1974).
The judicial allegiance objective derives from the other objectives discussed in the text (as well
as the efficiency objective mentioned by Hardisty) and captures a well-accepted aspect of the
judicial system. See, e.g., Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L.
REV. 3, 4 (1967) ('The doctrine can be stated simply: there is an absolute duty to apply the
law as last pronounced by superior judicial authority.").
182. Other possible categories of decisions that may be considered less than authoritative
are summary dismissals and affirmances and per curiam decisions.
183. Cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), not 'binding precedent" because its discussion of the plain view doctrine "has never
been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court").
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rationales supporting the result to determine the extent to which they
overlap. Generally, courts must follow the result of a plurality opinion.
Courts must also follow any rationales that have attracted a majority
of the Court, even if that majority does not join any one opinion. No
other rationales are binding, however.
The justification for the "result" stare decisis rule1- is the reason-
able assumption that the precedential court will decide similar cases
the same way, even if it is unable to agree on a rationale for the
result in such cases. 18 Failure to abide by the result of a plurality
opinion will needlessly sacrifice predictability, uniformity, judicial al-
legiance, and reliability. The plurality decision in United States v.
Mendenhal1 86 serves as an example. Five justices of the Court found
that federal narcotics agents did not violate the fourth amendment
when they stopped the defendant and asked her questions after finding
she met certain elements of a drug courier profile. The opinion was
a plurality decision because two of the five justices reached this result
by concluding that there was no seizure, and thus that the fourth
amendment was not implicated at all, 1 7 while the other three assumed
there was a seizure but found that the facts on which the officers
relied in stopping the defendant constituted reasonable suspicion. '
The four dissenters argued that the defendant had been seized and
that reasonable suspicion had not existed.' s9 Despite the inability of
the five justices favoring the result to agree on a rationale, it would
be improper to ignore the Mendenhall result in a case with similar
facts. Given the same facts, 19° the Court would presumably reach the
same outcome.
184. This term comes from Hardisty, supra note 181, at 52-57. Hardisty distinguishes
between result stare decisis and rule stare decisis, which describes a subsequent court's following
the rule, rather than merely the result, of the precedental court. Id.
185. See Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUAL
L. REV. 756, 779 (1980). ("[It seems clear that lower courts must adhere at the minimum to
the principle of 'result' stare decisis, which mandates that any specific result espoused by a
clear majority of the Court should be controlling in substantially identical cases.").
186. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
187. Id. at 555. Justice Stewart authored the opinion, which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id.
at 546.
188. Id. at 562-65. Justice Powell wrote the opinion, which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined. Id. at 560.
189. Id. at 566. Justice White wrote the opinion, which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens joined. Id.
190. Of course, if the facts of the subsequent case diverge significantly from the facts giving
rise to the plurality decision, then result stare decisis is inapplicable. For example, if the police
in a case subsequent to Mendenhall confronted the defendant more aggressively than the police
confronted Mendenhall, a court could reasonably find that a seizure had occurred and that the
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A more compilcated determination is whether any of the rationales
supporting the result in a plurality opinion are binding. In some so-cal-
led plurality decisions, a majority agrees not only on the result but
also on the rule. For example, only three justices joined Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in Texas v. Brown,19I which held that an officer need
have only a probable cause belief, rather than virtual certainty, that
items seized in plain view are evidence of crime.192 But both Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined, and
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined, espoused the notion that probable cause is sufficient
to justify a plain view seizure.'13 Despite the existence of three separate
opinions in Brown, the entire Court agreed on a single rationale jus-
tifying the result.
result in Mendenhall does not control. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (a seizure
occurs when agents confront defendant in same manner as in MendenliUll but retain the defen-
dant's ticket and driver's license). Or regardless of how one decides the seizure issue, a court
might find the result in Mendenhall inapposite because the facts leading to police action in its
case differed from those available to the agents in Mendenhall and therefore did not give rise
to reasonable suspicion. Compare Justice Powell's opinion in Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560-61
(reasonable suspicion exists when defendant arrives from a source city, is the last to leave the
plane, appears nervous, claims no luggage and goes to the desk of an airline other than one on
which she arrived) with Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (no reasonable suspicion when
defendant arrives from a source city, nervously looks over shoulder, has no luggage other than
a shoulder bag, and makes efforts to conceal he is traveling with someone else). Distinctions of
this type are easily made in areas of law that are fact-specific (as is the case with the definitions
of "seizure" and "reasonable suspicion") and thus significantly undercut the impact of result
stare decisis. See infra text accompanying notes 355-72.
191. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
192. The plain view exception to the warrant requirement, which derives from Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), itself a plurality opinion, permits police to seize an item
if it is (1) "immediately apparent" as evidence of crime; (2) discovered "inadvertently"; and (3)
located in an area in which police may lawfully be. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, ch. 11 (discussing the three elements of the plain view doctrine).
Brown focused primarily on the first element and held that Coolidge's "immediately apparent"
language "was very likely an unhappy choice of words"; the plain view doctrine requires only
a probable cause belief that the evidence seized is related to criminal activity. 460 U.S. at 741.
See also Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1153-54 (1987) (any degree of suspicion less than
probable cause insufficient under plain view rule).
193. Justice Powell's opinion stated that he concurred "in the judgment and... with much
of the plurality's opinion relating to the application in this case of the plain-view exception to
the Warrant Clause." Id. at 744 (Powell, J., concurring). His only reason for writing separately
was to emphasize his disagreement with dicta in Rehnquist's opinion concerning the importance
of the warrant clause generally. Id. at 744-45.
Justice Stevens also concurred in the result and agreed with Rehnquist's equation, described
supra note 192, of probable cause and Coolidge's "immediately apparent" language. Id. at 747
(Stevens, J., concurring). His sole purpose for writing the opinion was to challenge the lawfulness
of the search that followed the seizure. Id.
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Brown exemplifies a "false" plurality opinon.'9 Many plurality opin-
ions are not, however, so easily labeled. For instance, in Michigan v.
Clifford,195 the Court held that evidence obtained from a warrantless
search of a burned-down home five hours after the fire was inadmis-
sible. Four members of the Court justified this result on the ground
that the fourth amendment requires an administrative warrant before
such a search. 1' A fifth justice, Justice Stevens, concurred in the
result because he felt that the homeowner should have received ad-
vance notice of the search; however, he did not agree that a warrant
was required.'97 The remaining four members of the Court believed
that neither a warrant nor notice was required in this situation. ' -"
Thus, five justices would not require a warrant for a post-fire search
conducted shortly after the fire. But five justices would require some
pre-search action by the police, either a warrant or notice. Does this
mean that the fourth amendment mandates notice before a post-fire
search can take place, even though only one justice supports this
position?
The Supreme Court has tried to minimize the problem that such
swing opinions create through the "narrowest ground" doctrine. This
doctrine requires adoption of the plurality rationale that is most re-
stricted in scope and most closely tailored to the facts of the case.' 99
But this approach has several problems.20° For instance, in Clifford,
which rationale is the narrowest? Justice Stevens' notice requirement
might seem narrower since it does not require a warrant. But as
Justice Stevens pointed out, advance notice may provide more protec-
tion to homeowners than the plurality's warrant requirement, since a
warrant can be obtained ex parte and is often a rubber stamp. 201 Thus,
in this instance, the narrowest ground approach provides no guidance
for deciding which rationale should govern future cases. Since a major-
ity endorsed neither the notice nor the warrant rationales, neither
194. This denomination is borrowed from Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decision-
making, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1130 (1981).
195. 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
196. 464 U.S. at 297. Justice Powell wrote the opinion, which Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall joined. Id. at 288.
197. 464 U.S. at 303 (Stevens, J., concurring).
198. 464 U.S. at 309-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. See Note, supra note 185, at 761.
200. Id. at 761-67 (narrowest ground doctrine is subject to several interpretations, neglects
distinction between result and rationale, hampers development of the law, and gives dispropor-
tionate power to the "swing' Justice).
201. 464 U.S. at 303 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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should be considered binding. A lower court is free to choose either
rule or develop another.202
When careful examination of the rationales in a plurality decision
fails to reveal a rule common to a majority of the judges, the rationales
are true plurality rules and should not be binding. The court's inten-
tions are not sufficiently clear to trigger the stare decisis doctrine.
Such true plurality rules are frequent at the Supreme Court level,
even when one looks only at fourth amendment cases.20 3 Florida courts
do not have to conform their opinions to these rules, despite the 1983
amendment to article I, section 12.204
202. On the other hand, the result in Clifford should be honored. Since the officials in
Clifford neither obtained a warrant nor gave notice, the evidence found during the search was
excluded. Because the Court would presumably reach the same result were it to hear another
case with similar facts, lower courts must exclude evidence obtained under similar circumstances.
See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
203. In addition to cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct.
1492 (1987) (only four justices agreed that fourth amendment's application to the workplace is
to be decided on a case-by-case basis); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (only four justices
joined opinion stating that warrantless seizure of car in non-exigent circumstances is permissible);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (only four justices agreed to "inadvertency"
requirement in plain view seizure cases, see supra note 192); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573 (1971) (only four justices joined the Court's discussion of declarations against interest as
an indicator of informant reliability).
204. Before leaving plurality opinions, one Supreme Court plurality opinion that raises
issues peculiar to Florida should be mentioned. In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971),
three justices joined Justice White in his opinion finding that the undercover use of body bugs
does not require a warrant. Id. A fifth justice, Justice Black, concurred in the judgment,
reasoning that because it does not specifically mention "communications" as one of the aspects
of privacy protected by its provisions, the fourth amendment does not apply to such eavesdrop-
ping. Id. at 754 (Black, J., concurring) (referring to reasoning set forth in his dissent in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967)). White was repudiated by the Florida Supreme
Court in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981), affg 371 So. 2d 1047, 1052 (3d
D.C.A. 1979), the decision that triggered the 1983 amendment. And White was the primary
case cited by Florida courts holding that Sarmiento did not survive the amendment. See, e.g.,
State v. Hume, 463 So. 2d 499, 500 (1st D.C.A. 1985), affd as to relevant part, 512 So. 2d 185
(Fla. 1987); State v. Ridenour, 453 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984).
These latter holdings are clearly correct, but only because other Supreme Court cases, both
before and after White, reached the same result by a clear majority vote. See, e.g., United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). If, however,
these other cases did not exist, and if the 'qntent" of the amendment's adopters was ambiguous
with respect to overturning Saniento, but see supra note 110, then the amendment would not
require such a finding. White's pronouncement concerning body bugs attracted only a plurality
of the justices. Admittedly, Justice Black provided a fifth vote in favor of White's result; one
could thus argue that result stare decisis requires Florida courts to follow that result. But the
rationale for that fifth vote was the failure of the fourth amendment to mention communications.
Florida's constitution, on the other hand, specifically protects communications, see supra text
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b. Dictum
Even when a majority of the Court supports a rule or rationale,
it might not be binding precedent because it is dictum. The traditional
test used to distinguish between rules that courts must follow and
dicta that courts can ignore is whether the statement is necessary to
the decision.2°5 But, as one commentator has noted, 20 the only conclu-
sion that is really necessary to any decision is the court's order. In
order to define dictum so that Florida courts can meaningfully apply
it, one must examine the reasons for according particular legal state-
ments precedential effect and labeling others dicta.
First, the concept of result stare decisis is as relevant here as
when determining the precedential significance of plurality opinions.
If two cases are factually similar, then the principle of stare decisis
dictates that they be decided alike, regardless of whether the rationale
in the first case is a holding or dictum. The difficulty arises when the
facts of the cases are not substantially similar, yet the rule in the
first case appears to govern the subsequent case. When is such a rule
dictum with respect to the second case and when is it a holding that
the court must follow?
accompanying note 87, a fact of supreme importance to a strict constructionist like Justice Black
and one that, had it been true of the federal Constitution, might have led him to join the four
dissenters in White. See Black's opinion in Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing that admitting evidence obtained through a body bug should be prohibited
under the Court's "supervisory authority over federal criminal justice"). Put another way,
despite the general soundness of the result stare decisis principle, construing the 1983 amendment
to mean that Florida courts must follow White would be a stark abnegation of state sovereignty
and constitutional independence, given the basis for Black's position in White. While this example
involves a plurality opinion, the same kind of situation could arise with a majority opinion if,
for instance, a majority of the Court had adopted Black's position in White.
205. See Hardisty, supra note 181, at 58 ("[The] most popular definition of dictum [is] a
judicial statement of a legal rule which was not 'necessary' to the judicial result."). Wambaugh
suggests another definition: that dictum is an opinion on a question that could have been decided
either way without affecting the outcome of the case. E. WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES
14 (2d ed. 1894). Wambaugh contends that such statements should be avoided because they
"waste [judicial] strength," threaten the adversary process by focusing on issues that may not
have been raised by the parties, and violate separation of powers doctrine because they are,
in effect, "advisory" opinions in violation of article III of the United States Constitution. Id. at
10-11. While these considerations may explain why unnecessary statements should be avoided,
they do not explain why, when they are found in an opinion, they should not be accorded
precedential weight, nor do they help us decide what dictum is.
206. See Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REv. 509, 509 (1952).
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To some, dictum is simply any judicial statement that a subsequent
court considers wrong.2 7 But this cannot be the basis for distinguishing
dictum from holding if the principle of stare decisis is to retain any
meaning. Predictability and uniformity would obviously be sacrificed
by such a notion. So also would any sense of judicial hierarchy; particu-
larly when the context is the extent to which a lower court must
follow a superior court, a definition of dictum based on the lower
comt's perception of the superior court opinion's correctness cannot
be countenanced.203 Finally, the impact of this approach on the relia-
bility of judicial decisionmaking is at the least problematic, given the
difficulty of determining whether a decision is right or wrong. 209
On the other hand, one cannot designate as holdings all judicial
statements that enhance predictability, uniformity, and lower court
allegiance. Any relatively precise judicial statement meets this test.
For the purpose of defining dictum, the most important goal of stare
decisis is to ensure reliable decisionmaking. This goal forces one to
ask which attributes of a legal statement, apart from its perceived
rightness or wrongness, make it a rule worth following.
207. See, e.g., Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain Error Rule, 71 GEO. L. REV. 945,
989 (1983) (arguing for a "functional" rather than precedential approach to legal analysis because
"Itihe propriety of any result can rest upon nothing more than the persuasiveness of the analysis
offered to support it").
208. This is not to say, of course, that a previous decision by a superior court cannot be
wrong; it is merely to say that the principle of stare decisis means little if a lower court may
ignore a superior court decision it considers "wrong." In the context at issue here, the 1983
amendment to article I, § 12 would mean little if Florida courts could ignore a Supreme Court
decision they considered wrong.
Green argues, however, that lower courts should have some authority to ignore higher court
precedent. Green, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which
It Should Be Applied, 40 ILL. L. REV. 303, 319 n.73 (1946) ("if the [lower court] is convinced
that the former decision should be reconsidered [it] may refuse to follow it so as to give the
appellate court the opportunity to reconsider"). Green's argument assumes the reviewability of
the lower court decision, whereas a Florida court decision on the conformity issue would not
normally be reviewable by the Supreme Court. See supra note 170. It is possible, however,
that a Florida court decision that intentionally miscontrues Supreme Court precedent may be
considered an inadequate state law basis for the decision. Id. While Green's position could
therefore be adapted to the situation in Florida, this article will assume that the judicial system
generally, and article I, § 12 in particular, require lower courts to abide by official higher court
decisions. See Kelman, supra note 181, at 4.
209. See supra note 147 for a discussion of neutral principles.
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Commentators who have addressed this issue have focused on a
number of factors.2 10 Wambaugh argued that the primary considera-
tions in differentiating holding from dictum are the quality and quan-
tity of thought the precedential court gives the rule.211 He emphasized
the reputation and experience of the precedential court, the extent to
which the statement was briefed and argued, and the degree to which
the statement is justified in the opinion. 212 Others distrust the impor-
tance of these types of factors, preferring to focus on the relation of
the rule to the disposition and facts of the case. Oliphant, for instance,
believed that a scientific approach to stare decisis requires one to look
at what courts do, not at what they say; legal doctrine is not observ-
able, only its application is.213 Thus, to him, the precedential weight
of a rule is gauged by the extent to which it avoids generalizing beyond
the facts of the case. 214 Similarly, Goodhart, building on the work of
Pollock, 215 stressed that the legal conclusions that merit the strongest
210. The author is indebted to Professor Charles Collier, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Florida, for making available his unpublished paper, The Concept of Dictum:
Redefining the Marginal in Legal Doctrine. The following discussion of Waumbaugh, Oliphant,
and Goodhart is derived in part from this paper, although any distortion of their ideas is
attributable solely to the author.
211. E. WAMBAUGH, supra note 205, at 103 (The precedential value of a rule "var[ies]
with the learning of the court and with the amount of thought bestowed by the court upon the
point covered by the [rule]."). Elsewhere, Wambaugh states: "What makes decisions of value
as precedents is the fact that they are based upon reasoning and not upon chance.... ."Id. at 25.
212. Id. at 103, 119. See also Wambaugh, How to Use Decisions and Statutes, in BRIEF
MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 111 (R. Cooley ed. 1909) ("It is true that, as [dicta]
are not required as steps toward the decision of the very case, they may have been uttered
without full argument from counsel and without full consideration from the court; but if they
can be shown to have been considered carefully, or to have been pronounced by unusually skillful
judges, already well acquainted with the subject, no lawyer denies that they are of conse-
quence.").
213. Oliphant, A Return, to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 n.5 (1928) ("The thesis is
that facts are the only stimuli capable of scientific study as a basis of prediction.").
214. Oliphant admitted that a "[d]ecision in the sense meant in stare decisis must...
refer to a proposition of law covering ... as a minimum, the fact situation of the instant case
and at least one other. ... " Id. at 72. He also argued, however, that stare decisis "is indifferent
to broad generalizations or is made apprehensive by them . . . [and] uses generalizations to
suggest and to orient . . . experimentation but not to replace it." Id. at 75. Pound expressed
a similar sentiment when he stated, "[w]hat needs rectification is a judicial habit of following
language extracted from its setting by text writers, of adherence to formulas instead of to the
principle of decisions, and the taking of the words for law rather than the judicial action which
those words sought to explain." Pound, What of Stare Decisis, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 13 (1941).
215. See F. POLLOCK, The Science in Case-Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
ETHICS (1882), reprinted in F. POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 169 (A.
Goodhart ed. 1961).
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precedential authority are those most closely tied to the material facts
of the case. According to Goodhart, "[it is by his choice of the material
facts that the judge creates law. ' '216 To both Oliphant and Goodhart,
a rule loosely connected to the result and the facts is likely to be less
reliable, regardless of the degree of justification given for it.217
This simple synopsis of some of the leading commentators' thoughts
on precedent is not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of this
amorphous subject.28 It is sufficient to suggest, however, factors a
court might consider in deciding whether a given rule is dictum or
binding. While these factors are not completely compatible, as
Oliphant's criticism of Wambaugh's approach indicates, taken together
they give a court some tools for determining what is dictum. The
remainder of this article's treatment of dictum will examine a number
of cases to illustrate how Florida courts might draw the line between
dictum and holding, while adhering to the 1983 amendment to article
I, section 12.
Consider first Illinois v. Andreas.21 9 In Andreas, police lawfully
searched a table that had arrived at an international airport, and found
that it contained marijuana. The police then repacked the table and
delivered it to the addressee. The addressee took the table into his
apartment, but reappeared some thirty to forty-five minutes later
with the apparently unopened package. The police searched the pack-
age again, without a warrant. The lower court found this second search
216. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 169 (1930).
217. For instance, Oliphant states that stare decisis, in its traditional sense, keeps its
attention pinned to the immediate problem in order that a wise solution of it
may be found. It stoutly refuses to answer future questions, prudently awaiting
the time when they enter the field of immediate vision and become issues of
reality in order that their solution may be brought the illumination which only
immediacy affords and the judiciousness which reality alone can induce.
Oliphant, supra note 213, at 75.
Goodhart said much the same thing:
A divorce of the conclusion from the material facts on which that conclusion is
based is illogical, and must lead to arbitrary and unsound results .... The first
and most essential step in the determination of the principle of a case is, therefore,
to ascertain the material facts on which the judge has based his conclusion.
Goodhart, supra note 216, at 169.
218. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that dictum "describes so much that it can
truthfully be said to describe nothing." Note, supra note 206, at 512. The commentator also
suggests that this fuzziness is intentional because it allows judges or attorneys to avoid more
easily statements of law they do not like. Id. at 509. This article merely attempts to provide
some handle on the topic; it does not purport to treat definitively the concept of dictum.
219. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
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impermissible because the police were not "absolutely sure" the pack-
age still contained the marijuana.220 The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that there need be only a substantial likelihood in such control-
led delivery situations that the package still contains contraband. '1
Although the police in Andreas could not be absolutely sure the
package contained the drugs, it has been suggested they were "virtu-
ally certain" it did.2 Virtual certainty represents a level of confidence
falling somewhere between the lower court's absolute certainty test
and the Supreme Court's substantial likelihood standard. Is the sub-
stantial likelihood language therefore dictum? That is, would it be
permissible for a lower court faced with a similar controlled delivery
situation to require virtual certainty that the contents of the delivered
item are unchanged before a warrantless search may take place?
The substantial likelihood test was not necessary to resolving An-
dreas, because applying a virtual certainty test could have produced
the same result. But in light of the factors developed above, this lan-
guage should not be considered dictum. First, the Court did not casu-
ally adopt the substantial likelihood test. It carefully justified the rule
in language that suggested resistance to any standard calling for a
very high degree of certainty. Finding that the crucial question is
determining at what point, after surveillance is interrupted, one's
expectation of privacy revives,2 the Court concluded that "it would
be absurd to recognize as legitimate an expectation of privacy where
there is only a minimal probability that the contents of a particular
container had been changed." Second, although the Court's rule is
not as closely tied to the material facts of the case as it could be,
since the police probably were virtually certain of the container's con-
tents, the practical difference between the Court's rule and a virtual
certainty test is negligible. Few searches authorized by the Court's
language will be based on a level of suspicion significantly different
from the level of suspicion the police in Andreas possessed.
A harder case is New York v. Belton,2 which involved the proper
scope of a search incident to the arrest of a car occupant. In Belton,
220. State v. Andreas, 100 Ill. App. 3d 396, 402, 426 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (1981).
221. 463 U.S. at 773.
222. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMIENDMENT
559 (1987) ("The facts of Andreas, it should be noted, are such that the outcome would probably
have been the same under a 'virtual certainty' test"). See 463 U.S. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See 463 U.S. at 772.
224. Id. at 773.
225. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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a police officer stopped a car, observed signs of marijuana use, directed
the four occupants to get out of the car, and arrested them. After
positioning the arrestees in four separate areas of the roadside to
prevent close contact, the officer searched the interior of the car. He
found a jacket that had a zippered pocket containing cocaine. In finding
this evidence admissible, the Court stated: "we hold that when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. '' -
This language was not strictly necessary to the opinion. In order
to find the Belton search lawful, the Court did not need to state that
the interior of a car may be searched whenever there is a lawful
custodial arrest of its occupant. Moreover, in contrast to Andreas,
the Belton holding is much more likely to cover situations unlike that
encountered in Belton. Suppose, for instance, that instead of a one-to-
four police-to-occupant ratio, the ratio were reversed and three officers
physically held the defendant while the fourth officer searched the
car. The potential for harm to the police or for destruction of evidence,
the traditional bases for the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement,2 are significantly less on these facts than on
the Belton facts. Yet the Belton holding would permit such a search.
Could it therefore be considered dictum? Could a lower court exclude
evidence found during such a search?
Despite the reach of Belton's language beyond the material facts
of the case, applying the criteria for measuring precedential value
suggests the language should be followed even in the hypothesized
case. Most important, the Belton Court explicitly considered the pos-
sibility that its rule was too sweeping. The Court noted that not every
arrest of a car's occupant will present obvious danger to the police or
give rise to possible destruction of evidence.229 But the Court concluded
that despite the possible overbreadth of the rule, "'[a] single, familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."'229 This
conclusion and others like it2 o show that the Court carefully considered
the propriety of a broad rule in this situation.
226. Id. at 460.
227. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 164.
228. 453 U.S. at 457.
229. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
230. For example, the Court stated that "the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most
instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 701 1987
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The explanation the Court offered for its broad rule in Belton could
be seen as a justification for treating any judicial statement as a
holding, so long as the statement stems from a recognizable reasoning
process rather than an offhand or conclusory remark. This view is
especially tempting in the search and seizure context. As Professor
LaFave has argued, fourth amendment protections can be realized
only under rules that enable police officers to determine correctly
beforehand whether an invasion of privacy is justified.23 1 Labeling
overinclusive language as dictum would stifle such rule-oriented juris-
prudence.
But the desire for guidelines should not obscure the importance of
ensuring reliable decisionmaking. In order for a broad rule - even a
well-justified one - to be considered binding, it should also have some
connection to the results and facts of the case in which it is announced.
A further ground for regarding Belton's search incident rule as a
holding is that the breadth of the rule was needed to justify the specific
search upheld in the case. That search involved reaching into a jacket
pocket, an area unlikely to contain weapons or evidence easily acces-
sible to the arrested individuals.232 When the rule is unrelated to the
case's material facts, however, its precedential value should be mini-
mal. In these circumstances, as Oliphant and Goodhart pointed out,2 3
the rule is much more likely to be ill-considered since the court will
have dealt with the issue only in the abstract. 4
invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."' Id. at 458 (quoting LaFave,
"Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142). The Court also stated, "[w]hen a person cannot know how a court
will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope
of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority." 453 U.S.
at 459-60.
231. LaFave, supra note 230, at 142.
232. The New York Court of Appeals, in excluding the evidence, had held that "[a] warrant-
less search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search
incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate
might gain access to the article." State v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421,
429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
233. See supra note 217.
234. Justice Blackmun made the same point in his dissenting opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega,
107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987), in which a plurality of the Court held that neither the warrant nor
probable cause requirements apply to work-related investigations. Id. at 1501-02. Blackmun
stated that "[blecause [fourth amendment] analysis, when conducted properly, is alvays fact-spe-
cific to an extent, it is inappropriate that the plurality's formulation of a standard does not arise
from a sustained consideration of a particular factual situation." Id. at 1506 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Later, he stated, "the plurality's general result is preordained because, cut off from
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United States v. Place furnishes an example. There, airport police
detained an individual's baggage for ninety minutes while awaiting
the arrival of a trained narcotics detection dog. The Court found that
this detention violated Terry v. Ohio,' 6 the seminal decision establish-
ing that individuals may be detained temporarily on reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity. 723 The Court reasoned that, even assuming
the police in Place had reasonable suspicion, their ninety minute de-
tention of the defendant's baggage exceeded the temporary detention
Terry authorized. Such a detention is permitted only when police have
probable cause; in Place they did not.2 The Court also stated, how-
ever, that having a trained narcotics dog sniff luggage in a public
place is not a search because it detects only contraband and is not
particularly intrusive.29 The latter statement is clearly dictum. Once
the Court found the stop unconstitutional, it had decided the case and
its comments on dog searches were gratuitous. The majority's conclu-
sion on that issue is not binding precedent because it does not explain
the result reached in Place, nor is it connected to the case's material
facts, all of which concerned the initial stop, not the subsequent search.
One might point out that the conclusion about dog searches is from
the United States Supreme Court, not a secondary appellate court,
and that the Court's reasoning on the subject occupied over a page
of its opinion. Wambaugh in particular considered these types of fac-
tors important in deciding whether a rule should be binding.240 But
imagine a case in which the only issue is whether a dog sniff of luggage
is a search. Focused on this issue, the Court might decide differently,
no longer insulated from the consequences of such a decision by its
resolution of the case on other grounds. Even if the Court reaches
the same result, the facts of the case before it or the arguments of
the dissenting justices may influence the ultimate rule, producing a
a particular factual setting, it cannot make the necessary distinctions among types of searches,
or formulate an alternative to the warrant requirement that derives from a precise weighing
of competing interests." Id. at 1513.
235. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
236. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2:37. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 199-204 (describing
Terry doctrine).
238. 462 U.S. at 708-09.
239. Id. at 707.
240. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the issue was not
presented to or decided by the lower courts, nor did the parties brief it, 462 U.S. at 723
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), factors that might reduce the resulting rule's precedential effect in
Wambaugh's eyes.
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holding that limits the circumstances under which warrantless intru-
sions by narcotics dogs may be conducted.2 1 Only a case that forces
the Court to face directly the import of a decision that a dog sniff is
not a search should be considered binding.? 2
From the foregoing, one could construct the following scheme for
determining whether a legal conclusion must be followed. First, one
should consider whether the conclusion is a clear logical antecedent
of the result in the case. This step eliminates as binding precedent
rules that have a tenuous connection to the facts of the case, as with
the Place Court's pronouncement about dog searches. If the rule is
necessary, however, the next focus should be on the rule's breadth.
This second step involves evaluating the extent to which the rule
purports to govern other fact situations that are significantly different
from the fact situation before the court announcing the rule. If the
rule encompasses only minimally different fact situations, as with the
rule announced in Andreas, then it should be considered a holding. If
the rule purports to govern widely divergent fact situations, as a third
step one should examine the extent to which the announcing court
justified its broad rule. If the rule is merely an offhand remark or is
only vaguely explained, it should be considered dictum. If its breadth
is explicitly justified, as in Belton, it should be considered a holding.
241. For instance, the Court might not permit such use of dogs if the owner is present at
the time the luggage is sniffed, if the luggage is of a personal nature, or if the use of the dog
requires a seizure of either the person or the luggage. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 222, at
373-74. Similarly, the Court might decide that a dog sniff is a search, but permit such searches
on less than probable cause. Id. at 375.
242. A second example of what may happen when a holding is not tied to the facts comes
from another constitutional arena. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held
that once an individual who has received the Miranda warnings states that he wants an attorney,
"the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474. Although carefully
justified by the Court as a means of overcoming the coercive atmosphere of custodial interroga-
tion, id. at 470, this rule had no connection to the facts of any of the four cases joined together
before the Court in Miranda. See Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965) (no
warnings given until the end of the interrogating process), rev'd, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v.
Miranda, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965) (no warnings given, defendant did not request counsel),
rev'd, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201
(no warnings given, no request for an attorney), cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937 (1965); People v.
Vignera, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1965) (defendant not warned). To
view Miranda's rule regarding post-warning requests for an attorney as a holding would force
subsequent courts to apply a rule from which the Court easily could, and did, withdraw once
confronted with a fact situation directly raising the issue and forced to contemplate the conse-
quences of its decision. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (police may interrogate
defendant after request for an attorney if defendant initiates conversation).
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Rules falling between these two extremes are admittedly hard to
categorize.
Many Supreme Court statements about the fourth amendment meet
even the relatively narrow definition of dictum advanced here.2 " The
1983 amendment does not require Florida courts to abide by these
pronouncements. As with plurality opinions, they are not authorita-
tive.
c. "Predictive" Stare Decisis
This term is meant to convey the notion that, absent an on-point,
authoritative superior court opinion, lower courts should try to reach
results they think higher courts would reach. Lower courts commonly
engage in such predictive decisionmaking. Indeed, one might argue
that lower courts are obligated to predict how a superior court would
decide the issue being addressed.?4
Thus, while plurality opinions and dictum may not be binding in
a technical sense, perhaps they should be followed nonetheless. A
plurality rationale, particularly one that has attracted four members
of the Supreme Court, may have an aura of inevitability. Similarly,
dictum may be a good indication of the stance the announcing court
would take were it to address the issue directly. This type of reasoning
has a superficial appeal. Predictability and uniformity would be prom-
oted most easily if lower courts followed all pronouncements of the
superior court, even nonauthoritative ones. And when a lower court
diverges from a plurality opinion or dictum, it arguably displays dis-
respect for the judicial hierarchy.
But, as pointed out earlier,-5 this reasoning neglects the fourth,
and perhaps most important, goal of stare decisis - enhancing the
reliability of judicial decisionmaking. When a superior court rule is a
243. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) (suggesting support for a "plain
odor" exception to the warrant requirement); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (suggesting
that, if the purpose is to obtain fingerprints, a brief detention in the field is permissible on
mere reasonable suspicion, and a detention in the stationhouse is permissible on less than
probable cause when judicially authorized); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)
(suggesting that roadblock stopping all cars is permissible even if no suspicion).
244. Indeed, lower courts are arguably obligated to ignore superior court decisions that
are directly on point if, as a result of subsequent superior court precedent, the earlier precedent
appears to have been overruled. Note, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise
of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH L. REV. 87, 91-93 (1984). However, this implicit overrule
doctrine is an extremely limited one. See infra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying note 209-17.
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true plurality rationale, or when a superior court's legal conclusion
meets the narrow definition of dictum developed above, it has not
been subjected to a sufficiently rigorous reasoning process. In such
cases, it need not be followed, although predictability, uniformity, and
judicial allegiance may be sacrificed to some extent. This is especially
true in the context at issue here, where countervailing state interests
may be implicated.- 6 Thus, article I, section 12 should not require
Florida courts to follow inferences from Supreme Court pronounce-
ments that come from true plurality rules or dicta.
For the same reasons, Florida courts should not be obligated to
follow rules derived from analogies to Supreme Court decisions. While
Supreme Court rulings that are not on point may provide helpful
guidance in analogous cases, they should not control. The Florida
Supreme Court seems to agree with this conclusion. In State v.
Cross,?7 the issue was whether section 12 required the renunciation
of State v. Grrubbs48 and State v. Dodd,2-9 pre-amendment decisions
that had ruled that the exclusionary rule applies at probation revoca-
tion proceedings. The state conceded that the United States Supreme
Court had not yet addressed this issue.35 But the state also pointed
out that the Court had decided that a probationer is not entitled to
the full panoply of rights guaranteed a typical defendant.2' It further
noted that the Court had indicated that the deterrent effect of the
rule generally is not enhanced when the rule is applied at proceedings
other than criminal trials.22 In response to these arguments by anal-
ogy, the Florida Supreme Court simply stated that the United States
Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the exact issue before it.25 The
court held that it would continue to follow Dodd despite the 1983
amendment. 5 Although the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Cross
246. See supra text accompanying notes 125-50 for a discussion of the countervailing in-
terests.
247. 487 So. 2d 1056 (Fla.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986).
248. 373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979).
249. 419 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1982).
250. 487 So. 2d at 1057.
251. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973) (differences between criminal trial
and revocation hearing justify a case-by-case approach to right to counsel at the latter type of
hearing).
252. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21 (1984) (police acting in good faith
will not be deterred by exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976) (applying
exclusionary rule in habeas corpus cases will not deter police).
253. 487 So. 2d at 1057.
254. Id. at 1058.
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could have followed the state's suggestion, it legitimately relied on
state judicial history in reaching a contrary result.
It would not be surprising if the United States Supreme Court
eventually agreed with the state's arguments in Cross.25 But as Cross
illustrates, a Florida court need not abide by such a prediction. Put
differently, the 1983 amendment does not require predictive stare
decisis. Until the United States Supreme Court issues an authoritative
opinion, Florida courts are free to develop their own approach to
search and seizure law.
As the next several sections show, even when an authoritative
Supreme Court opinion exists, Florida courts might not be required
to conform.
2. Authoritative Opinion Not Based on the Fourth Amendment
The 1983 amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida constitu-
tion requires Florida courts to conform their rulings to United States
Supreme Court decisions construing the fourth amendment. It does
not require Florida courts to follow Supreme Court decisions constru-
ing other sources of law, except as a minimum standard. Thus, for
example, through interpretation of the pertinent Florida constitutional
provisions Florida courts may provide a criminal defendant a more
expansive right to counsel,2 6 confrontation,27 or due process2 than
the Supreme Court presently requires under the federal Constitution.
255. The Court is much more solicitous of the right to counsel than of the fourth amendment
right, see C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 5, yet in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at
778, it was unwilling to find even the former right unequivocally applicable to probation revo-
cation proceedings. Moreover, as Stone, 428 U.S. at 465, makes clear, the Court's assessment
of the exclusionary rule is now focused entirely on the rule's ability to deter police misbehavior.
Applying the exclusionary rule at a probation revocation proceeding, when it will also be applied
at any trial stemming from the event that triggered the revocation proceeding, is unlikely to
add appreciably to the deterrent effect of the rule.
It should, however, be pointed out (and the Florida Supreme Court could certainly have
done so), that when the event triggering the revocation proceeding is not of the type that will
lead to criminal charges - for example, possession of a licensed weapon - excluding illegally
seized evidence from the revocation proceeding may well exert some deterrent effect. Moreover,
even when the event triggering revocation does violate a criminal statute, probation officers
may not care if their irregularities in conducting a search reduce the chance for a criminal
conviction, so long as probation is revoked and sentence reimposed, again suggesting a need to
apply the rule at revocation proceedings as well as at trial. Finally, the Supreme Court's recent
relaxation of fourth amendment requirements in the probation context may render elimination
of the exclusionary rule redundant. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
256. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
257. Id.
258. Id. § 9.
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Some Supreme Court decisions that establish rules governing
search and seizure are grounded not only on the fourth amendment
but also on other constitutional provisions. When the non-fourth
amendment predicate in such an opinion is essential to the Court's
holding, Florida courts should have the authority to repudiate that
particular predicate and arrive at a more protective overall standard.
In such cases, Florida courts need not follow a Supreme Comt majority
holding on search and seizure law, despite the 1983 amendment.
Assume, for example, that the United States Supreme Court
explicitly holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply in probation
revocation proceedings, basing its decision on the two rationales prof-
fered by the state in State v. Cross.-9 That is, the Court holds that
illegally seized evidence is admissible in revocation proceedings be-
cause (1) excluding such evidence would not significantly increase the
deterrent effect on police already achieved by excluding the evidence
during the substantive criminal prosecution for the offense and (2)
probationers do not deserve the same procedural protections extended
to individuals who are not under state control at the time of their
offense. Clearly, the first rationale is an interpretation of the fourth
amendment. The Court established some time ago that deterrence is
the primary purpose for excluding evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment. 20 But the second rationale stems from the due
process clause. The Supreme Court's decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,2r1
the leading case endorsing the proposition that probationers are enti-
tled to less process at revocation proceedings than is due criminal
defendants at trial, is imbedded in the fourteenth amendment.2 2 If
this second rationale were considered essential to the Court's holding
on the scope of the exclusionary rule, rather than merely an alternative
reason for that holding, then a Florida court construing Florida's con-
stitutional due process provision more expansively could decide to
reject the Court's ruling that illegally seized evidence is admissible at
probation revocation proceedings.26 Because the holding is not based
exclusively on the fourth amendment, a Florida court need not follow
it.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 247-52.
260. See cases cited supra note 252.
261. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
262. The Court framed the issue in Gagnon as "whether an indigent probationer or parolee
has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel at [probation and parole revo-
cation] hearings." Id. at 783; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (whether due
process requires that a state afford an individual opportunity to be heard prior to revoking
parole).
263. As explained supra note 255, there are good reasons for doing so in this context.
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Several Supreme Court decisions on search and seizure law can be
characterized as mixed rationale cases. For example, United States
v. Calandra,2"  holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in
grand jury proceedings, is based as much on an assessment of the
traditional functions of the grand jury as on the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule. 2- The opinion in Gerstein v. Pugh,261 which held that
post-arrest probable cause determinations do not require procedural
formalities, is probably best described as an interpretation of the sixth
amendment's rights to counsel and confrontation, 26 despite other lan-
guage in the opinion referring to the fourth amendment.2- Similarly,
MeCray v. Illinois,29 which held that the defendant contesting a pro-
bable cause determination based on an informant's testimony is not
automatically entitled to know the identity of the informant, is pre-
mised primarily on an interpretation of the sixth amendment's confron-
tation clause.2 7 In such cases, a Florida court willing to adopt a more
protective standard than the Supreme Court's with respect to the non-
fourth amendment rationale can justifiably reject the Court's ultimate
holding despite its fourth amendment overtones.
3. Authoritative Opinion Superseded by State Law
The 1983 amendment requires only that Florida courts constru6
the search and seizure provision of the Florida Constitution in confor-
mity with United States Supreme Court decisions on the fourth amend-
ment. If, however, other provisions of the Florida Constitution, or
264. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
265. Id. at 349 ("In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceed-
ings, we must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury
against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this context.").
266. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
267. Id. at 122 ("[Because] value [of confrontation and cross-examination] would be too
slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and
safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determi-
nation of probable cause . . ., [such] determination is not a 'critical stage' in the prosecution
that would require appointed counsel." (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (sixth
amendment case)).
268. Id. at 120 ("adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause determination
required by the Fourth Amendment.").
269. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
270. Id. at 312-13 (defendant's argument that the Constitution compels state to abolish the
informer's privilege "is based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
upon the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation [as applied] to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
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Florida statutory, regulatory, or common law, mandate greater protec-
tion of privacy rights than is required under the Court's fourth amend-
ment decisions, then Florida courts are obligated to provide that pro-
tection and disregard Supreme Court precedent. Here the focus will
be on available state constitutional and statutory grounds, although
it should be recognized that other sources of state law might also
provide a basis for decision on search and seizure issues.271
a. Constitutional Law
The provision of the Florida Constitution most likely to provide
an alternative source of law on search and seizure issues is the right
to privacy provision in article I, section 23. Added to the Florida
Constitution in 1980, the section reads, in pertinent part: "Every nat-
ural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein." 2
Potentially, this provision gives Florida courts an opportunity to evade
article I, section 12 altogether.
Montana's experience illustrates how this might occur. For a time,
the Montana Supreme Court endorsed linkage whenever provisions of
the Montana Constitution were similar to the federal version.2r Since
271. Cf. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc. v. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83 (lst D.C.A.
1978) (establishing common law right to disclosural privacy), quashed sub nomz. Shevin v. Byron,
Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
272. The full provision reads: "Right of Privacy. - Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right to access to public
records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
273. The Montana Supreme Court has vacillated considerably on the linkage issue. In State
v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 164-65, 566 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1977), it appeared to link the state
privilege against self-incrimination provision with the federal provision. One year later, however,
it stated that "state constitutional provisions [that are] identical or nearly identical with like
language in the United States Constitution... each constitute separate and enforceable constitu-
tional rights insofar as the jurisdiction of ... Montana extends." Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont.
54, 60, 589 P.2d 126, 129 (1978). But during the same term the court seemed to accept the
proposition that the search and seizure provision in the Montana Constitution afforded defendants
no greater protection than does the fourth amendment. See State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105,
113, 582 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1978). Moreover, in State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983), the
court explicitly held that "where the language in the Montana Constitution is identical to the
language in the United States Constitution, we should feel bound by the determinations made
by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting that language." Id. at 260. Finally, two
years after Jackson, the Montana Supreme Court decided Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01
(Mont. 1985), which stated that "[f]ederal rights are considered minimal and a state constitution
may be more demanding than the equivalent federal constitutional provision .... This is true
even though our state constitutional language is substantially similar to the language of the
Federal Constitution." But though Pfost probably means the court has rejected the linkage idea,
[Vol. 39
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Montana's search and seizure guarantee is virtually identical to the
fourth amendment,274 such a policy presumably would have required
Montana courts to follow United States Supreme Court search and
seizure pronouncements. But the Montana Supreme Court refused to
do so on several occasions, 275 stating that the privacy provision in the
Montana Constitution2 6 affords state citizens additional privacy protec-
tion and justifies a more expansive version of search and seizure law
than the United States Supreme Court espoused.277 If Florida courts
adopted this approach to search and seizure, they could reject virtually
any Supreme Court rule despite the 1983 amendment to article I,
section 12. Section 23's protection from governmental intrusion could
be construed to guarantee a privacy right beyond that afforded by
section 12's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, particu-
larly since the Florida Supreme Court has held that a compelling
governmental interest must justify infringement of privacy under sec-
tion 23, while a search under section 12 need only be reasonable. 27s
the court clearly had adopted linkage from 1983 to 1985, and perhaps from 1977 to 1985, at
least in the search and seizure area. For a detailed treatment of this history, see Collins, supra
note 71.
274. Compare MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from un-
reasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the
person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation reduced to writing
with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
275. These cases have been decided before, during, and after the linkage period described
supra note 273. See, e.g., State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273 (Mont. 1985) (holding inventory search
unconstitutional); State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984) (invalidating search because no
probable cause to support a warrant for eavesdropping); State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105,
582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (holding electronic interception by private third parties unconstitutional).
276. "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 10.
277. For example, in State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984), decided while the linkage
doctrine established in Jackson, 672 P.2d at 255, was in force, Justice Morrison stated that the
Montana court "has afforded greater rights in search and seizure cases because the Montana
Constitution specifically recognizes the importance of the right of privacy." 693 P.2d at 521.
The Alaska Supreme Court has followed the same approach. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 706 P.2d
317 (Alaska 1985) (search and seizure law in Alaska more expansive than federal law because
of right of privacy clause found in ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22); City of Juneau v. Quinto, 684
P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1979).
278. In Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985), the court
stated that "[tihe right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling
state interest standard." Id. at 547. It also stated that the drafters of the provision wanted "to
make the privacy right as strong as possible." Id. at 548.
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Applying Florida's privacy provision to search and seizure cases
turns out to be a more complicated endeavor, however. First, section
23's guarantee, unlike the Montana privacy provision, 2- applies "except
as otherwise provided herein," suggesting that the right can be in-
fringed when other sections of the constitution allow such infringe-
ment. The Florida Constitution expressly provides that when used in
the constitution, "herein" refers to the entire constitution, thus includ-
ing section 12.2 ° On the other hand, the legislative history of article
I, section 23 indicates that the "as otherwise provided herein" clause
was included solely to preserve the viability of the Sunshine Amend-
ment, 8s1 which requires financial disclosure by public officials, and pub-
lic access to official meetings.- Moreover, as Cope points out, because
the Florida Constitution confers broad, undefined grants of power on
the legislative,2 executive,? and judicial branches, the phrase, im-
properly construed, could encourage standardless encroachment on
the privacy right.?86 Cope notes that a broad construction of the phrase
279. See supra note 276.
280. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12.
281. Id. art. II, § 8.
282. See, e.g., Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 671, 743 (1978) ("except as otherwise provided herein" language "inserted to make
clear that the right of privacy does not undercut the constitutional provisions relating to financial
disclosure, public records, and open meetings"). Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 609, 656 (1978) ("The language 'except as provided herein' was designed solely to
preserve the Sunshine Amendment"). It is a well-established principle of construction that
judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision should attempt to effect the intent of the
provision's adopters. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also 10 FLA. JUR. 2d
Constitutional Law § 22 (1979) (intent of framers and adopters controlling).
The final version of the privacy provision, adopted after the commentators cited above had
written their articles, contains a second sentence stating that the section "shall not be construed
to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." See
supra note 272. Because the "except as otherwise provided" language was retained even after
the addition of this sentence, one could argue that it should now be interpreted more expansively
to include as its referent not just the Sunshine Amendment but the entire constitution. The
precise reason for adding the second sentence, however, was not to protect the Sunshine Amend-
ment; rather its purpose was to prevent derogation of Florida's Public Records Act, FLA. STAT.
§ 119 (1979) and the public meeting provision of the Public Business Title of the Florida Statutes.
FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1979). See Note, Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 565, 580 (1981). In any event, given the conclusion reached below,
resolving the meaning of the "as otherwise provided" clause in § 23 is probably not that important.
283. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting "the legislative power" in the legislature).
284. Id. art. IV, § 1 (vesting "the supreme executive power" in the Governor).
285. Id. art. V, § 1, (vesting "the judicial power" in the supreme court and specified inferior
courts).
286. Cope, supra note 282, at 749-50.
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would condition the right to privacy on an arbitrary determination as
to whether the challenged governmental activity either falls or does
not fall within legislative, executive, or judicial power.
The precise import of the "as otherwise provided herein" language
is therefore unclear. But even without this language one could argue
for narrow construction of section 23. Florida courts have long held
that constitutional provisions should be read in harmony with one
another whenever possible.2 7 Under the harmonizing principle, courts
should interpret section 23 so as to avoid overlap with section 12.
Generally, this conclusion has much to recommend it. Adopting
the Montana "search-and-seizure-plus-privacy" approach would in ef-
fect judicially repeal the 1983 amendment. But the importance of sec-
tion 23 to search and seizure litigation cannot be completely ignored,
both because the legislative history of the provision suggests otherwise
and because even those aspects of the right to privacy that are not
directly concerned with search and seizure may implicate government
investigation techniques. Article 23 should at least retain significance
in those search and seizure cases that involve the types of privacy
the provision seeks to protect.
The Constitution Revision Commission that drafted the privacy
amendment specifically contemplated a possible conflict between sec-
tion 12 and section 23, and noted that the policies underlying section
23 might call for a different result than would be reached under section
12.2 -" Thus, for example, in response to a question about the relation-
ship between the two provisions, Commissioner Shevin stated: "I rec-
ognize we will be giving the court a choice between the interpreting
of [section 12] and this amendment provision and trying to decide
which one prevails." After evaluating the Commission's deliberations
on this topic, one commentator concluded that when the reasonableness
of a search is unclear, the right to privacy could "tip the balance" for
the court and cause it to invalidate the search.2
287. See supra note 169; see also 10 FLA. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 44 (1979) ("It is
a fundamental rule of construction that, if possible, amendments to the Constitution should be
construed so as to harmonize with other constitutional provisions.").
288. See Dore, supra note 282, at 656.
289. 2 Transcript of Fla. Constitution Revision Commission Proceedings 44 (Jan. 9, 1978)
[hereinafter Fla. C.R.C.] (remarks of Robert Shevin) (quoted in Dore, supra note 282, at 656
n.289).
290. Dore, supra note 282, at 656. Dore also states that
[wihile it generally was understood that search and seizure questions would not
be affected by [the privacy provision], the record reflects no intention to foreclose
the possibility that they might be affected. Rather, it left the issue for judicial
resolution, understanding that the competing interests would have to be balanced.
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As tempting as such a position might be for those who favor a
maximum degree of independence for Florida courts, it is probably
inappropriate. Limiting the impact of section 23 only to close search
and seizure cases does violence both to the intent of those adopting
the provision and to the notion that article 12 should be respected as
an independent constitutional provision. A more discriminating assess-
ment of the relationship between articles 23 and 12 should take into
account the types of searches and seizures that the adopters of the
former provision believed the language would cover.
Of the many concerns that the drafters of section 23 addressed, a
fear of government snooping had the most direct bearing on search
and seizure law. For instance, Commissioner Brantley was concerned
about undercover operations designed to compile dossiers on everyday
behavior of individuals who are not suspected of any particular criminal
activity.2 91 Similarly, Commissioner Douglas, upon the Commission's
adoption of the privacy proposal, stated that the proposal was meant
to "prevent[] this nonsense of Big Brother is watching you . ... "292
More generally, the Commission was sensitive to the threat to indi-
vidual privacy posed by technological advances in data collection. - ,
Information as to whether the voters who ratified section 23 shared
the concerns identified by the Commission is scanty, 21 but Florida
courts cannot ignore this legislative history when deciding how to
apply the section to search and seizure issues.295
This history might prove influential in certain types of search and
seizure cases. For example, in United States v. Miller,2 the United
291. Fla. C.R.C., supra note 289 (remarks of Lew Brantley) (described in Cope, supra
note 282, at 759).
292. Van Gieson, Protection of Rights Endorsed, Miami Herald, Jan. 10, 1978, at 2B, col. 5.
293. See Address by Commissioner Ben F. Overton to the Constitution Revision Commission
(July 6, 1977) ("There is a public concern about how personal information concerning an individual
citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business.") (quoted in Cope, supra
note 282, at 722); see also Cope (who monitored the entire Commission process), supra note
282, at 759 ("If the section 23 right of privacy means anything, it must mean that government
cannot compile dossiers on citizens without justification, engage in unauthorized surveillance,
or collect private information unnecessarily for placement in agency files, whether or not open
to the public.").
294. A review of newspapers at the time of the vote on the amendment, which took place
on November 4, 1980, reveals little commentary. See, e.g., Matsuda, Right-of-Privacy Proposal
Wins Floridians' Approval, Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 1980, at 19A, col. 4 (supporters say privacy
amendment "would curb excessive, computerized data collection, wiretapping, and eliminate
laws prohibiting sexual conduct between consenting adults, homosexual and heterosexual.").
295. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
296. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment is not impli-
cated when the government seizes personal records voluntarily surren-
dered to a bank. According to the Court, one assumes the risk that
third parties will gain access to this information. Similarly, in Smith
v. Maryland,'297 the Court held that under the fourth amendment a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity
of phone numbers called, because one knows or should know that the
phone company routinely records these numbers. In United States v.
Karo,"9'2 the Court found that using a beeper to detect the public
movements of a can of ether is not a search. And, as a final example,
in Dow Chemical v. United Statesm the Court refused to call it a
search to use sophisticated camera equipment to take aerial pictures
of the defendant's plant, again on the ground that it violates no reason-
able expectation of privacy. In each of these cases, the Court permitted
government access to personal information without requiring any
showing of individualized suspicion. The Commission's concern over
illegitimate government snooping could convince a Florida court that
despite its obligation under section 12 to follow Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on the fourth amendment, section 23's independent pro-
tection of privacy permits it to reject Supreme Court rulings of the
type described above.3-
The focus to this point has been on legislative history that casts
light on the extent to which the drafters of section 23 meant to protect
the type of privacy implicated in search and seizure cases. The section
was also meant to protect aspects of privacy not typically associated
with government investigation of criminal offenses. Thus, for instance,
section 23 could apply to government invasions of privacy through
unauthorized disclosure of private facts301 or to government interfer-
ence with individual decisionmaking concerning fundamental in-
297. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
298. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
299. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
300. Some other areas yet to be addressed by the United States Supreme Court that might
implicate § 2.3 include video surveillance, see C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14,
at 318-20, and cases involving surreptitious, non-electronic eavesdropping ("uninvited ear" cases),
see id. at 303-04; see also State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1985) (finding
electronic surveillance permitted by the fourth amendment impermissible in Florida, apparently
on the basis of added protection afforded by § 23 and Florida statute). But see Madsen v. State,
502 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987) (police officer's use of body bug in defendant's bedroom
did not violate § 23).
301. See, e.g., Cope, suzira note 282, at 756 (arguing § 23 would be violated if private
information is placed in public files, absent good reason for doing so).
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terests.30 2 Although unlikely, some searches or seizures might implicate
these interests and therefore implicate section 23. For instance, in
State v. Johnson,303 a Florida county court suppressed the results of
a nonconsensual roadside sobriety test and videotape on the ground
that they violated the suspect's section 23 right to avoid public disclo-
sure of personal matters.- Because the analytical focus of the decision
is on disclosural privacy rather than on intrusion into one's reasonable
expectations of privacy, its holding should stand even if the United
States Supreme Court reaches a contrary holding under the fourth
amendment.
b. Statutory Law
Despite the 1983 amendment to section 12, courts must follow a
statute that provides more protection than the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment decisions require. Section 12 only requires linkage between
Florida's constitutional search and seizure provision and Supreme
Court opinions. It does not authorize repeal of duly enacted statutes
that place more restrictions on police practices than those opinions.
The precept has been accepted, at least implicitly, by the Florida
Supreme Court305
302. See generally Note, supra note 282, at 581-88.
303. 8 Fla. Supp. 2d 116 (Broward County Ct. 1984).
304. Id. at 117, 119-20.
305. See State v. Riley, 462 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1984) (after finding fourth amendment
not violated by police securing house before obtaining a search warrant, Florida Supreme Court
emphasized that Florida statutes not violated either).
In State v. Casal, 410 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1982), cert. dismissed sub nom. Florida v. Casal,
462 U.S. 637 (1983), decided before the 1983 amendment, the Florida Supreme Court excluded
evidence seized from the forward hold of a motored vessel after the occupants had been arrested.
The court found that the searching officers did not have probable cause to believe that evidence
of criminal activity was in the hold and that the occupants of the vessel did not voluntarily
consent to the search. Id. at 155-56. As the dissent pointed out, id. at 156-57 (Alderman, J.,
dissenting), this result seems contrary to the fourth amendment decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (after lawful arrest, officers justified in making warrantless search of arrested person
and vehicle without probable cause). But the majority apparently based its decision on FLA.
STAT. § 371.58 (1977), which prohibits initial boarding unless there is probable cause or consent.
410 So. 2d at 155.
Supporting this interpretation of Casal is the United States Supreme Court's ultimate refusal
to review the decision, stating that it rested on an adequate and independent state ground.
Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637 (1983). Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion (concurring in
the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) noted that the independent
state basis could have been either the statute or article I, § 12, id. at 638 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), the Florida court's opinion made no mention of the latter provision.
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Several Florida statutes impose more stringent restrictions on
searches and seizures than does the fourth amendment as construed
by the Supreme Court. For instance, Florida's stop and frisk statute
allows a police officer to frisk an individual who has been temporarily
detained only if the officer has "probable cause to believe [the person]
is armed with a dangerous weapon."3 6 Under Supreme Court prece-
dent, on the other hand, police need only meet the lesser reasonable
suspicion standard to conduct such a frisk.- 7 Florida's electronic sur-
veillance statute requires police to get a warrant before they may
obtain information from a communication common carrier.3°s In con-
trast, Smith v. Maryland0 9 held that police do not need probable
cause, much less a warrant, to obtain telephone numbers from a phone
company, because their solicitation of such information is not consi-
dered a search.lo Under the same statute, it would be impermissible
to bug a prisoner's cell without obtaining a warrant, 311 despite the
Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Palmerl 2 that under the fed-
eral Constitution a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in the cell.313
A number of other Florida statutes might require a ruling placing
more restrictions on police behavior than the fourth amendment pre-
sently requires. For example, section 901.21 of the Florida Statutes
provides that a police officer may conduct a search incident to arrest
306. FLA. STAT. § 901.151(5) (1985). See also Woody v. State, 464 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1985) (officer must have reason to believe defendant is armed before frisk may be
conducted).
307. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) ("there must be narrowly drawn authority
to permit" reasonable search for weapons to protect police officer who has reason to believe
individual armed and dangerous, regardless of probable cause to arrest); see also Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("[Teinry] does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked .... ").
308. See FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(a)(2) (1985) (agent of communication common carrier may
provide information, facilities or technical assistance to officer authorized to intercept a wire or
oral communication"); id. § 934.07 (authorization for interception of wire or oral communications
requires judicial order).
:309. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
310. Id. at 742-44 (no subjective or objective expectation of privacy in phone numbers).
311. The statute only permits warrantless interception by the police when one or both of
the parties to a conversation have consented to the interception. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c), (d)
(1985).
312. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
313. Id. at 525-26 ("[Slociety is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective
expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and . . . accordingly, the
Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines
of the prison cell.").
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"for the purpose of: (a) [p]rotecting the officer from attack; (b) [p]re-
venting the person from escaping; or (c) [d]iscovering the fruits of a
crime. 13' 4 Arguably, this statute does not permit the type of search
the Supreme Court authorized in United States v. Robinson,31 r5 which
allowed a full search even when the arrest is for a minor traffic offense
unlikely to involve any danger, possibility of escape, or fruits of
crime. 316 As another example, a unique provision of Florida law
explicitly adopts the holding in Carroll v. United States,3 '7 a 1925
Supreme Court decision governing searches of vehicles.3 1 8 Although
the Supreme Court has not overruled Carroll, its more recent decisions
have narrowed the protection that decision seemed to afford. 3 9 Argu-
ably, the Florida statute requires Florida courts to adhere to the
original meaning of Carroll, rather than more recent glosses on it.
Finally, many Florida statutes establish requirements that the Su-
preme Court is unlikely to endorse as a matter of federal constitutional
law. For instance, Florida law requires that a warrant be executed
within ten days,3 20 a provision that Florida courts have strictly con-
strued.321 This statutory provision would apply even if the Supreme
Court were to hold, as it is likely to,- that a warrant is not stale
under the fourth amendment until a much longer period of time has
elapsed.m
314. FLA. STAT. § 901.21 (1985).
315. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
316. See id. at 234-35 ("It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority
of the search . . . ").
317. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
318. See FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1985).
319. See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth
Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 35 (1983) (United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), "apparently totally rejected Carroll's dicta that warrants must
be obtained where 'reasonably practicable."'); see also Katz, The Automobile Exception Trans-
formed: The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE IV. RES.
375 (1986).
320. See FLA. STAT. § 933.05 (1985).
321. See, e.g., Spera v. State, 467 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
322. This conclusion stems from the Court's demonstrated reticence about enforcing "tech-
nical" search and seizure requirements through the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Maryland v.
Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987) (warrant need not correctly state address of searched premises);
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (warrant need not describe accurately items
being sought).
323. Several other Florida statutes dealing with technical requirements impose more restric-
tions on police than the United States Supreme Court is likely to impose under the fourth
amendment. Compare Collins v. State, 465 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985) (requirement
in FLA. STAT. § 933.06 (1983) that officer seeking warrant swear oath to magistrate is not a
(Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 718 1987
FLORIDA'S 'FORCED LINKAGE"
An interesting case in this regard is State v. Bernie, 324 involving
a Florida statutory provision prohibiting search warrants of homes in
narcotics cases unless "the law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is
being violated therein." An earlier Florida case, Gerardi v. State,32r
had held that this provision permitted issuance of a warrant only upon
a showing of probable cause to believe evidence of crime existed on
the premises to be searched at the time the warrant was sought.2 7 In
Bernie, however, the warrant affidavit alleged merely that narcotics
would be delivered to the residence to be searched pursuant to the
warrant. The Bernie court recognized that the Gerardi holding was
applicable, but then admitted the evidence anyway under authority
of the good faith exception the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished in United States v. Leon.m The court felt compelled to follow
Leon because of the 1983 amendment.329
The Bernie decision is wrong. Although as a matter of principle it
makes little sense to prohibit warrants based on predictions when
probable cause exists to believe the prediction,3 ° the fact remains that
the Florida statute, as Florida courts presently construe it, prohibits
such warrants. Leon is irrelevant to the issue unless, as explained
below, Florida courts choose to make it applicable as a matter of
judicial statutory construction.
technicality that can be waived, even if officer believed in good faith his obligation to tell truth
to judge was a sufficient oath) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1983) (permitting
search executed in good faith belief warrant is valid). Compare also Rodriguez v. State, 484
So. 2d 1297, 1297-98 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986) (Florida's knock and announce statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 933.09 (1983), violated when officer did not wait for response after knocking, even though
gun and cocaine in residence) with Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (officers' failure to
give notice before conducting search justified because officers had reason to believe defendant
possessed narcotics that could be easily destroyed and because of defendant's "furtive conduct"
one hour before arrest).
324. 472 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1985).
325. Id. at 1245 (quoting FLA. STA. § 933.18(5) (1983)).
326. 307 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
327. Id. at 855.
328. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing exception to exclusionary rule when officer conducting
search pursuant to a warrant believes in good faith warrant is valid).
329. 472 So. 2d at 1246-47. The court stated that its "research has revealed no United
States Supreme Court decision reaching the same result as Gerardi. Instead there are recent
decisions which announce a 'good faith' exception to the warrant requirement and therefore
require us to reach a different result." Id. at 1246.
330. See 2 IV. LAFAVE, suvra note 222 at 95-96 (better view reflected in "recent cases
[that] have consistently held that anticipatory search warrants are not inherently beyond the
warrant process permitted by the Fourth Amendment"). See, e.g., Alvidres v. Superior Court,
12 Cal. App. 3d 575, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Glen, 90 N.Y.2d 252, 282
N.E.2d 614, 31 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1972).
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c. Sanctions
Supreme Court precedent governs the remedy for a violation of
article I, section 12, as amended. Supreme Court precedent does not,
however, govern the proper remedy for violations of article I, section
23 (the privacy provision) or the statutes described above. Because
the 1983 amendment applies only to the search and seizure provision
in article I, section 12, Supreme Court decisions concerning the scope
of the exclusionary rule apply only to violations of that provision.
Some of the statutes noted above, such as the stop and frisk law,":
the electronic surveillance statute,32 and the "Carroll vehicle-search"
statute,m expressly provide for exclusion of evidence police obtained
in violation of those laws. Florida courts are required to exclude evi-
dence in these situations. The remedy for violations of the other sta-
tutes described above and for violations of the privacy provision is
more open to question, but exclusion is probably mandated in these
situations as well. In Gildrie v. State,3 the 1927 decision that estab-
lished the exclusionary remedy in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court
held that the possibility that defendants might go free "should not
deter this court from enforcing the provisions of the Constitution of
the State of Florida and the provisions of the statute [sic] of this state
which were made . . . as a protection against the invasion of the
dwelling house of every man."' 5 Gildrie thus adopted the exclusionary
sanction for all search and seizure violations, both constitutional and
statutory, as a matter of state law, at least for a search of a dwelling.
The court broadly reaffirmed this holding in Sing v. Wainwrightr-1
a year after Mapp v. Ohio37 imposed the rule on the states. In Sivg,
the Florida Supreme Court stated that Mapp "added nothing whatever
331. See FLA. STAT. § 901.151(6) (1985) ("No evidence seized by a law enforcement officer
in any search under this section shall be admissible ... unless the search which disclosed its
existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the [preceding] provisions.").
332. Id. § 934.09(9)(a):
Any aggrieved person... may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted
wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that:
1. The communication was unlawfully intercepted; 2. The order of authorization or
approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 3. The inter-
ception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.
333. Id. § 933.19(2) ("The same rules as to admissibility of evidence ... as were laid down
in [Carroll] shall apply ... in the state ... .
334. 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927).
335. Id. at 143, 113 So. at 706.
336. 148 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 922 (1963).
337. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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to the law of Florida. It created no new procedural right so far as
the jurisprudence of this State is concerned. This Court long ago
concluded that evidence obtained as the product of an unreasonable
search is not admissible in a criminal proceeding."" Gildrie and Sing
should still stand as authority for mandatory exclusion of evidence
seized in violation of state law other than article I, section 12. But
even if they do not support this position, or apply only to certain
types of searches (e.g., of dwellings), Florida courts have the authority
to adopt a blanket exclusionary remedy as the proper method for
sanctioning violations of section 23 and statutory provisions concerning
search and seizure.
One potentially significant implication of this point involves section
933.04 of the Florida Statutes.- 9 This provision, in language almost
identical to article I, section 12, requires that warrants issue only
upon probable cause and that they particularly describe the place to
be searched and things to be seized. ° If, as Florida courts may hold,
violation of this statute is found to require exclusion of the seized
evidence, then Leon and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard,11 permitting good faith violation of the fourth amendment par-
ticularity requirement, may not have any practical effect in Florida.
While these decisions govern the admissibility of evidence seized in
violation of the warrant requirement in article I, section 12, they do
not determine the admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the
warrant requirement in this section of the Florida Statutes, until the
Florida courts or the Florida legislature decide otherwise.
It might be argued that section 933.04 of the Florida Statutes,
unlike the other statutes discussed, merely codifies constitutional lan-
guage, and thus should carry the same exclusionary sanction as does
the constitutional provision, including the good faith exceptions out-
lined in Leon and Sheppard. But, as the next subsection points out,
even if this contention is valid, the fact that Leon and Sheppard were
decided in 1984 may undercut from another angle their precedential
force under article I, section 12.
'338. Id. at 20.
339. FLA. STAT. § 933.04 (1985).
340. The full statute states:
Affidavits - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated and
no search warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and
thing to be seized.
Id.
341. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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4. Authoritative Opinion Subsequent to the Amendment
The vote on the 1983 amendment to article I, section 12 took place
on November 2, 1982. The purpose of this section is to suggest reasons
why Florida courts need not follow United States Supreme Court
opinions decided after this date. The two reasons given here do not
necessarily establish that such prospective linkage is inappropriate,
but they do at least cast doubt on the wisdom of construing the amend-
ment so as to require it.
First, Florida courts should not feel compelled to follow post-
amendment Supreme Court decisions because they cannot be sure the
ratifiers intended such prospective linkage. Neither the amendment's
language nor the way it was explained on the ballot resolves whether
the amendment requires adoption of future Supreme Court opinions.
The Florida Supreme Court found the ballot summary of the amend-
ment adequate,- 2 but the summary, like the amendment, merely stated
that, under the proposal, Florida's search and seizure provision "shall
be construed in conformity with" Supreme Court decisions on the
fourth amendment.3 3 If prospective linkage were really intended, the
language of both the amendment and the ballot summary could have
more clearly stated that intent. For instance, the amendment could
have read, "This right shall be construed in conformity with the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, as it has been or will
be interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." Had the amend-
ment been so phrased, a majority of Florida citizens may have voted
against it, uneasy about leaving the future scope of their privacy rights
in the hands of a distant federal court.
Admittedly, a preference for the crime control approach to search
and seizure issues was a major motivating factor behind the amend-
ment's approval.- 4 One could interpret this to mean that the voters
wanted to establish Supreme Court opinions, whatever their content,
as the ceiling as well as the floor in this area. But many different
342. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982).
343. The full summary read as follows:
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. - Proposing an amendment to the State Constitu-
tion to provide that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution and to provide that illegally seized articles or information are inadmis-
sible if decisions of the United States Supreme Court make such evidence inadmis-
sible.
Id. at 304.
344. See supra note 176.
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gradations of the crime control model exist. At its most extreme, a
crime control system might place virtually no restrictions on police
investigative techniques.3'1 The outcome of the 1982 vote may well
have been different if Supreme Court decisions at the time had au-
thorized warrantless non-exigent searches of homes or permitted man-
datoly drug testing of all government employees. Therefore, the vote
should be construed as an approval of the crime control approach that
the Supreme Court endorsed at the time of the vote, not some other
crime control approachms
Even if the voters intended to approve all future Supreme Court
opinions when they voted for the amendment, they may lack the
authority to do so. This second argument against interpreting the 1983
amendment to require prospective linkage focuses on the voters' ability
to delegate future lawmaking power to an entity outside the state.
Significantly, the legislature clearly cannot do this. In Freimuth v.
State347 the Florida Supreme Court construed a Florida criminal statute
that defined "hallucinogenic drug" as "'lysergic acid ... and any other
drug to which the drug abuse laws of the United States apply.'
'')
The court found that a drug defined as hallucinogenic by a federal
law enacted after the effective date of this statute could not be included
345. Some commentators, for instance, would abolish the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 635 (1982); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA-
TURE 214 (1978). In many foreign countries, few restrictions on searches and seizures exist.
See generally Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1983);
Macdougal, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives - Remedies for Constitutional Viola-
tions in Canada and the United States, 76 J. CRIm. L. & CRIIINOLOGY 608 (1985); Comment,
Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648
(1983).
346. Even if the voters intended to endorse the most conservative crime control model
allowed by the federal Constitution, the 1983 amendment might not effectively accomplish that
goal. Suppose the United States Supreme Court were to overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). If this occurred, the fourth amendment would no longer require exclusion of illegally
seized evidence in state cases, but would continue to require exclusion of illegally seized evidence
in federal cases, pursuant to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Under this scenario,
which version of the fourth amendment does the 1983 amendment require the Florida courts
to follow? Arguably, Florida courts would have to continue to exclude illegally seized evidence
because the amendment requires linkage with Supreme Court cases construing the fourth amend-
ment, not the fourth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Ironically, the amendment would bind Florida courts to a more liberal standard than other
states had to follow under the federal Constitution.
347. 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972).
348. See FLA. STAT. § 404.01(3) (1971).
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within the statute's ambit, since it is "an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to adopt in advance any federal act or the ruling
of any administrative body that Congress or such administrative body
might see fit to adopt in the future. '' 9 Freimuth and its progenym
establish that the Florida legislature may not tie Florida law to as
yet unenacted law in another jurisdiction. Presumably, the rationale
of this line of cases is that state law should be the preserve of the
people of Florida; a rule does not become binding law in Florida until
the people, their elected representatives, a duly appointed state
agency, or a court so decide.
Similarly, a Supreme Court opinion on the fourth amendment
should not become binding in Florida until state voters have had the
opportunity to respond to it. The vote on the 1983 amendment provided
just such an opportunity with respect to Supreme Court opinions de-
cided before the vote, but not with respect to later Supreme Court
decisions. Thus, even if we assume the voters wanted to approve all
future Supreme Court decisions, they should not be allowed to do so,
because the Supreme Court is not responsive to them in the same
way the Florida legislature or judicial system is."'1 To conclude other-
wise would in principle allow Florida citizens to surrender future law-
making power to the State of California or a foreign country.
One response to both the intent and delegation arguments is that
the voters have the power to amend the amendment to article I,
section 12. 52 The ability to amend means that voters can overrule a
Supreme Court decision they find repugnant and that they do retain
some control over the lawmaking function even after they have surren-
dered it to that Court. But the amendment process is extremely cum-
349. 272 So. 2d at 476 (quoting Florida Indus. Comm'n v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So. 2d
599 (1945)).
350. See Hand v. State, 334 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976); State v. Camil, 279 So. 2d 832, 834
(Fla. 1973) ("substantive changes incorporating by reference laws of the Congress or those of
the legislatures of other states lack requisite initial title notice in the biennial revision required
by the Florida Constitution").
351. The citizens of Florida have virtually no say, of course, as to who sits on the United
States Supreme Court. In contrast, the Florida legislature is elected by qualified voters in the
state of Florida. See generally FLA. CONST. art. VI. Judges at the appellate level are appointed
initially, but must qualify for retention by a vote of the electors in a general election every six
years. See id. art. V, § 10(a). Judges at the county and circuit level are elected initially, see
id. § 10(b), and must qualify for retention through the election process as well. See id. § 11(b).
352. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5.
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bersome, and not amenable to fine-tuning. Even if amendment is
possible, until the voters act, Florida law on search and seizure will
be left to an entity that is not responsive to the Florida polity. Just
as the Florida legislature may not prospectively delegate its lawmaking
power to a federal agency despite its ability to enact a new statute
approving that agency's actions, Florida's citizens should not be able
to relinquish prospectively their control over the lawmaking process
to a federal court simply because they retain the ability to amend.
It would not be unreasonable, then, for a Florida court to find that
construing article I, section 12 to require linkage with post-amendment
Supreme Court decisions is contrary to the intent of the voters and
the constitutional prohibition against prospective delegation to non-
state institutions. Such a finding would mean that only those Supreme
Court decisions handed down before the vote on the amendment can
bind Florida courts.
B. Conforming to Binding Supreme Court Precedent
The previous discussion identified several situations in which
Florida courts could reasonably conclude that Supreme Court language
construing the fourth amendment is not language to which they need
conform their rulings, despite the commands of article I, section 12.
The following discussion assumes the existence of a pre-1983 Supreme
Court majority holding that does not implicate Florida statutory law
or article I, section 23 (the privacy amendment) and that addresses
an issue directly relevant to a case before a Florida court. In this
situation, the Florida court clearly must conform its ruling to the
Supreme Court holding. But the conformity determination itself is not
self-executing. Both factual and conceptual distinctions between the
353. To amend the Florida Constitution through the initiative process, the proposal must
be signed by eight percent of the electors in one-half of the congressional districts of the state
and by eight percent of the electors in the state as a whole before it may appear on the ballot.
Id. §§ 1, 5. Moreover, the proposal "shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected
therewith," id., a requirement that has been difficult to meet. See, e.g., Evans v. Firestone,
457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). If amendment is attempted through the legislature, the proposal
must be passed by three-fifths of the membership of each house before it can be submitted to
the general electorate. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. A constitutional revision commission may
also propose amendments, but this commission only convenes once every 20 years. Id. § 2.
Under any of these methods, the electorate must ratify the amendment proposal by a majority
vote. The vote may take place only at a general election at least 90 days after the proposal is
certified or at a special election called by three-fourths vote of the membership of each house.
Id. § 5.
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Supreme Court decision and the Florida case may exist. In making
these distinctions and deciding whether they should make a difference,
the previously discussed goals of stare decisis 4 - predictability, uni-
formity, judicial allegiance, and decisionmaking reliability - are again
relevant. At the same time, Florida courts should remember that
abject linkage is not good policy, at least when state precedent, local
morality, or reasoned analysis suggests a different result.
1. Factually-Based Conformity
Many Supreme Court holdings on the fourth amendment are ex-
tremely broad, even though they are not dicta under the analysis
previously presented in this article. For instance, consider the Court's
decision in Rakas v. Illinois35 that the standing inquiry in fourth
amendment cases should depend "upon whether the person who claims
the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the invaded place. ''9 6 This language is a holding rather than
dictum, 57 and Florida courts must follow it. But the holding remains
so amorphous that it has little precedential impact. Rakas and later
cases rejected earlier, relatively precise Supreme Court standing
rules. Determining whether a person has standing to contest a search
now involves a multi-factor analysis, including examining the person's
authority to exclude others from the area, previous access to the area,
efforts to maintain privacy, and subjective expectations of privacy. 9
These cases in effect have made almost any standing case distinguish-
able on its facts from Supreme Court decisions on the subject, despite
the clear obligation to apply the legitimate expectations of privacy test.
In Rakas itself the Court found that the two defendants had no
standing to contest the search of the car they occupied at the time.GO
354. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
355. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
356. Id.
357. The Court forthrightly justified its adoption of the "legitimate expectations of privacy"
standard, see id. at 139-40, and applied it to the facts of the case. Id. at 148. It also explained
its rejection of both "target" standing, id. at 133-38, and the legitimate presence test for standing,
id. at 141-43. This type of reasoning, and its connection to the facts of the case, make it a
holding rather than dictum. See supra text accompanying notes 210-17.
358. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980).
359. See generally Slobogin, Capacity to Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old
Rules and Some Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 387, 399-413 (1981).
360. 439 U.S. at 148.
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But the defendants did not have a particularly strong case. They
asserted no ownership interest in the car or the items seized, nor was
there any suggestion that they had significant previous access to the
car. Neither defendant was driving the car, or related to the driver.
Finally, the defendants made little effort to protect against discovery
of the items seized. While, over time, the Supreme Court's position
on standing under these varying conditions will become clearer, the
process will undoubtedly be slow.s6s In the meantime, if a Florida
court were to hear a case in which any of these facts differed, the
court could reasonably find that the defendants did have standing to
contest the search.
The current Supreme Court's penchant for case-by-case analysis 36
means that, in a number of fourth amendment areas, Supreme Court
precedent does not bind Florida courts in any significant way. In
addition to its stance on the standing issue, the Court has explicitly
held that the voluntariness of a consent36 and the validity of a probable
cause determination 36 must be determined by the totality of the cir-
cumstances. In addition, the issue of when a seizure occurs or when
police have reasonable suspicion is largely factbound under the Court's
decisions.365 The Court's holdings as to when a search has taken place,3s
although perhaps providing more guidance than in the areas just noted,
also depend heavily on case-by-case treatment.3 67
Even when the Court has attempted to develop a so-called bright-
line rule, a lower court is seldom deprived of maneuverability. For
instance, New York v. Belton36s held that "when a policeman has made
361. The Supreme Court has not decided a standing case since Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 98,
a 1980 decision.
362. See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 5-6 (discussing Burger Court's
tendency to follow totality of circumstances approach in criminal procedure).
363. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
364. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). See also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S.
727, 732 (1984) (inveighing against artificial standards provided by the two pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test).
365. See, e.g., supra note 190.
366. See, e.g., cases discussed supra in text accompanying notes 296-99.
367. Indeed, the calculus involved in deciding whether a search has occurred is as murky
as the analysis in standing cases, see supra text accompanying notes 355-61, since both search
analysis and standing analysis contemplate an assessment of the reasonableness of one's expec-
tations of privacy. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1497 (1987) ("We have no talisman
that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable.").
368. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger com-
partment of that automobile. '" 369 This statement, as discussed previ-
ously,370 probably should not be considered dictum. It binds Florida
courts under article I, section 12. But that conclusion does not validate
every car search that takes place after the arrest of an occupant. It
must still be decided whether the arrest was lawful, whether the
detained individual was an occupant of the automobile, whether the
search was contemporaneous with the detention, and whether the
search strayed beyond the passenger compartment of the car.37' The
idea that any rule, no matter how precise, is subject to interpretation
is well-worn and need not be further belabored.3 72
Given the 1983 amendment's intent to impose the Supreme Court's
view on Florida courts, those courts should not flippantly distinguish
cases on their facts. But, after carefully appraising the facts before
it, a Florida court may believe the distinction between its case and
the relevant Supreme Court decision is so significant that adherence
to the Court's result would not advance the goals of stare decisis. A
Florida court may further believe that state precedent, local morality,
or reasoned analysis requires a result different from the Court's. In
such an instance, the amendment should not inhibit the Florida court
from reaching that result.
369. Id. at 460.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 225-32.
371. In his dissent in Belton, Justice Brennan pointed to several possible ambiguities left
after the decision:
Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if conducted five minutes
after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether
the suspect is standing in close proximity to the car when the search is conducted?
. . . [W]hat is meant by "interior"? Does it include locked glove compartments,
the interior of door panels, or the area under the floorboards? ... Are the only
containers that may be searched those that are large enough to be "capable of
holding another object"? Or does the new rule apply to any container even if it
"could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the
suspect was arrested"?
453 U.S. at 470. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 222, at 5-6, 14-18 (further discussion of
the ambiguity after Belton).
372. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 2
("uncertainty will be a by-product of any attempt to decide constitutional disputes"); Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69
(1958) (arguing that even simple rules are subject to ambiguity).
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2. Conceptually-Based Conformity
While the infinite variety of factual situations gives Florida courts
considerable leeway in deciding how to conform their decisions to
Supreme Court precedent, the conceptual framework the Court adopts
for resolving a particular type of issue still governs, so long as it is
a holding rather than dictum. For instance, Rakas' conceptualization
of standing as an inquiry into one's legitimate expectations of privacy
is clearly the law in Florida. 37 Florida courts cannot resort to a differ-
ent theoretical analysis in deciding standing cases. Occasionally, how-
ever, the Supreme Court substitutes one conceptual framework for
another and does not overrule the case or cases that established and
applied the now abandoned theory. In this circumstance, does the new
theory govern, or do the older cases control?
Given the desire for predictability, uniformity, lower court al-
legiance, and reliable decisionmaking, a Florida court should usually
follow the result of earlier case law, even if that result arguably
conflicts with the implications of a more recent Supreme Court holding.
In other words, given a choice between factually-based conformity
and conceptually-based conformity, the former generally should pre-
vail.
An example of this idea derives from the Supreme Court's body
bug cases.374 The precise issue in these cases is whether a recording
obtained through a monitoring device placed on a person with whom
the defendant voluntarily converses is admissible at trial when not
authorized by a warrant. In On Lee v. United States375 and Lopez v.
United States,76 the Court authorized the use of such recordings even
though the conversations took place on the defendants' premises. The
basis for these holdings was the trespass doctrine developed in
Olmstead v. United States,377 which established that the fourth amend-
ment is not implicated unless police commit a technical trespass on a
person's premises. On Lee and Lopez held, first, that no trespass
occurs when a defendant invites an individual into his home and vol-
untarily converses,3 78 and, second, that the presence of a body bug
does not convert this invitation into a trespass,3 79 because the bug is
not planted by an unlawful physical invasion of the defendant's home. 0
373. See supra note 357.
374. See supra note 204.
375. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
376. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
377. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
378. See 343 U.S. at 751-53; 373 U.S. at 438.
379. See 343 U.S. at 753-55; 373 U.S. at 438-39.
380. 373 U.S. at 438-39.
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In 1967, however, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United
States 5 1 Katz rejected the trespass theory of the fourth amendment
and adopted instead what has since become known as the reasonable
expectation of privacy test for assessing the scope of the amendment., 2
The Court thus explicitly overturned Olmstead. - But it left On Lee
and Lopez untouched.3 Suppose a Florida court, obligated by article
I, section 12 to follow Supreme Court decisions on the fourth amend-
ment, were faced with a body bug case, and that On Lee, Lopez, and
Katz were the only relevant Supreme Court decisions. Should the
court follow the result in On Lee and Lopez? Or would it be permissible
to rely on the reasonable expectation of privacy theory advanced in
Katz and find that using body bugs without a warrant violates the
fourth amendment because one does not reasonably expect that an
unseen eavesdropper will use an electronic device to monitor one's
private conversations?8
A Florida court placed in this dilemma must follow On Lee and
Lopez, despite the conceptual flux in the law. The definition of search
found in Katz and progeny is a holding and governs the inquiry.
But relying on that definition to require a warrant before wiring an
informant for sound would result in a disavowal of established, even
though perhaps partially discredited, Supreme Court precedent.-
381. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
382. Although the expectation of privacy language appeared only in Justice Harlan's concurr-
ence, id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), a majority of the Court soon adopted it as the standard
for determining whether a search had occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 14 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 369 (1968); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979) (elaborating on Justice
Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test).
383. 389 U.S. at 353.
384. As Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in Katz, On Lee and Lopez were
"undisturbed by today's decision." 389 U.S. at 363 n.** (White, J., concurring).
385. After Katz, the Supreme Court upheld On Lee and Lopez under the new reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality).
386. The Florida Supreme Court followed this latter rationale in State v. Sarmiento, 397
So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981) ('To assume the risk that one who participates in a conversation
held in the home might later reveal the contents of that conversation is one thing, but to assume
the risk that uninvited and unknown eavesdroppers might clandestinely participate in the con-
versation and later reveal its contents is another ... .
387. See supra note 382.
388. Indeed, the Court eventually made clear that Katz did not disturb its ruling in Oil
Lee and Lopez. See supra note 385.
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While this type of conformity analysis results in the retention of
a crime control holding, it might result in retention of a defense-
oriented holding as well. For instance, although it reconceptualized
the standing inquiry, Rakas did not overturn any of the Court's earlier
cases on standing.' One of these earlier cases is Jeffers v. United
States,39" in which the Court found that a defendant who possessed a
key to the searched apartment and enjoyed occasional access to it had
standing to contest seizure of contraband from that apartment. Florida
courts are bound to reach the same result on similar facts, even though
it could easily be argued that one does not possess a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in an apartment one does not occupy and only occa-
sionally visits 91
The one caveat to the conclusion that factual conformity should be
preferred over conceptual conformity occurs when Supreme Court
precedent is so weakened by subsequent Supreme Court deliberations
on related matters that the precedent has been implicitly overruled.3s
In this situation, the goals of stare decisis are best served by following
the more recent Supreme Court decisions. But, as many commentators
have pointed out, a determination that a Supreme Court decision has
been implicitly overruled by subsequent decisions should be extremely
rare.3 93 This resistance to a broad doctrine of implicit overruling is
particularly appropriate where, as in Florida, the lower court is under
a constitutional mandate to follow Supreme Court decisionsA 4 It also
389. The Court stated that "[w]e can think of no decided cases of this Court that would
have come out differently had we concluded, as we do now, that [the standing inquiry] is more
properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." 439 U.S. at 139-40.
390. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
391. Indeed, one Florida court appears to have improperly accepted this argument. See
State v. Mallory, 409 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982) (defendant had no standing with respect
to premises in which he kept personal belongings, occasionally stayed, and had freedom of
ingress).
392. See Note, supra note 244, at 91-93 (discussion of the implicit overrule doctrine).
393. Id. at 92 n.23 (canvassing various standards adopted by courts or suggested by com-
mentators, ranging from "near certainty" that- Supreme Court has overruled precedent to a
"rebuttable presumption" that precedent continues to be valid). See also Note, Lower Court
Disavowal of Suprefme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494, 501 (1974) (lower court disavowal
of Supreme Court precedent most appropriate "when it appears to a certainty that subsequent
Supreme Court decisions in an area have rendered a precedent obsolete, so that the precedent
serves only to confuse unwary litigants or judges").
394. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. The question remains how Florida courts should respond
to the situation described in the text. One commentator suggests a test that would allow a
finding of implicit overrule if the lower court is "reasonably certain" the precedent has been
overruled. See Note, supra note 244, at 92 n.23. This test he considers "high enough to give
effect to the notion that the Supreme Court should make its intention to devitalize a precedent
clear and unequivocal [and to support] the notion that lower courts should have good reason to
disregard on point Supreme Court precedent." Id.
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dovetails with this article's contention that the 1983 amendment to
article I, section 12 does not require predictive stare decisis.3 95
In short, Florida courts may ignore a reconceptualization of a fourth
amendment issue by the Supreme Court if it is dictum with respect
to the case before them and usually must ignore its possible import
if earlier, countervailing and unreversed Supreme Court decisions
clearly govern the case at hand. Of course, whether the earlier case
does govern depends on its factual similarity.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the forced linkage approach to search
and seizure issues established by the 1983 amendment to article I,
section 12 is an irresponsible surrender of state court prerogatives
and independence. Assuming that the amendment nonetheless will
continue to require adherence to Supreme Court decisions construing
the fourth amendment, this article has attempted to pinpoint a number
of situations in which Florida courts could find either that no relevant
Supreme Court precedent exists or that existing precedent does not
dictate a particular result in the case in question.
The underlying premise of these arguments is the belief that when
Supreme Court precedent does not clearly direct otherwise, Florida
courts should be permitted to fashion their own approach to search
and seizure law in order to maintain their analytical integrity and
preserve the preferences expressed in Florida legislative, judicial, or
social history. Of course, Florida courts may decide to follow Supreme
Court rulings even when not required to do so. But they should only
be required to do so under limited circumstances.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 244-55.
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